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Abstract When critical assets or functionalities are included in a piece of software
accessible to the end users, code protections are used to hinder or delay the extraction
or manipulation of such critical assets. The process and strategy followed by hackers to
understand and tamper with protected software might differ from program understand-
ing for benign purposes. Knowledge of the actual hacker behaviours while performing
real attack tasks can inform better ways to protect the software and can provide more
realistic assumptions to the developers, evaluators, and users of software protections.
Within Aspire, a software protection research project funded by the EU under
framework programme FP7, we have conducted three industrial case studies with the
involvement of professional penetration testers and a public challenge consisting of
eight attack tasks with open participation. We have applied a systematic qualitative
analysis methodology to the hackers’ reports relative to the industrial case studies and
the public challenge.
The qualitative analysis resulted in 459 and 265 annotations added respectively to
the industrial and to the public challenge reports. Based on these annotations we built
a taxonomy consisting of 169 concepts. They address the hacker activities related to
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(i) understanding code; (ii) defining the attack strategy; (iii) selecting and customizing
the tools; and (iv) defeating the protections.
While there are many commonalities between professional hackers and practition-
ers, we could spot many fundamental differences. For instance, while industrial profes-
sional hackers aim at elaborating automated and reproducible deterministic attacks,
practitioners prefer to minimize the effort and try many different manual tasks.
This analysis allowed us to distill a number of new research directions and potential
improvements for protection techniques. In particular, considering the critical role of
analysis tools, protection techniques should explicitly attack them, by exploiting anal-
ysis problems and complexity aspects that available automated techniques are bad at
addressing.
1 Introduction
Software running on the client side is increasingly security-critical. Mobile apps are
more and more used for sensitive functionalities (e.g., bank account management) and
a similar trend can be observed for web apps, due to recent frameworks (e.g., Angular)
that move most of the processing to a single page residing in the browser. Among
others, the sensitive operations that may run on the client side include authentication,
license management, and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) enforcement.
As a consequence, client apps (and the underlying libraries) contain critical assets
that must be secured. The state of the art approach to secure them is software pro-
tection. However, software protection is intrinsically a difficult task and the techniques
available in practice cannot defeat an attacker with an arbitrarily high amount of time
and resources available (e.g., theoretical results [5] show that perfect obfuscation is im-
possible in the general case). Hence, the assessment of software protections must take
into account an economical trade off between the attack difficulties that protections
introduce and the expected remuneration for a successful attack. Effective protections
are protections that make such a trade-off not convenient for the attacker.
The EC funded Aspire project (https://aspire-fp7.eu) has developed a software
protection tool chain that spans many different categories of techniques, including white
box cryptography, diversified cryptographic libraries, data obfuscation, non-standard
virtual machines, client-server code splitting, anti-callback stack checks, code guards,
binary code obfuscation, code mobility, anti-debugging, and remote attestation1. The
authors of this paper are the academic project partners and their task was to investi-
gate, develop, and validate novel protection techniques.
The empirical investigation consisted of two experiments. In the first experiment,
the three industrial partners of Aspire applied the protection tool chain to their re-
spective industrial case studies and evaluated its effectiveness with the help of profes-
sional penetration testers. The outcome of this experiment consisted of three reports,
Note on order of authors: The last five authors (in alphabetic order) participated to open
coding, conceptualization and paper writing. So did the two first authors, which also designed
the qualitative analysis and led the execution thereof. They also led the professional hacking
experiment design and process. The last two authors also led the design and execution of the
Public Challenge experiment.
1 The glossary in Appendix A presents brief descriptions of these techniques and of concepts
and terms introduced later in the paper.
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including detailed narrative information about the tasks conducted in the attempt to
defeat the Aspire protections. The reports describe the activities carried out during the
attacks, the encountered obstacles, the followed strategies, and the difficulty of per-
forming each task. They represent a unique opportunity to investigate the behaviour
of real-world expert hackers while carrying out an attack.
The second experiment was a Public Challenge. It consisted of eight small applica-
tions that were protected by the Aspire tool chain and were published on-line, offering
one prize per application to the first attacker able to successfully complete a given
attack task. Five applications were successfully broken, as it happened by the same
amateur hacker. That winner was interviewed over email to collect, in several itera-
tions, detailed information about his attack activities, encountered obstacles, followed
strategies, and attack difficulty. The responses in the emails were bundled into a single
report concerning general information about the hacker, his general impressions about
the challenges, and accounts on the five broken applications, which was then further
analysed.
The reports collected in the two experiments include invaluable knowledge on the
way hackers understand protected software. We applied a systematic qualitative anal-
ysis procedure to the reports. In particular, data from the first experiment with indus-
trial hackers were analysed using open coding, conceptualization, and model inference.
Instead, data from the second experiment (i.e. the Public Challenge) were analysed
with closed coding, conceptualization, and model inference, to extend the taxonomy of
concepts related to hackers activities, available after the first experiment.
The overall results of these experiments are a taxonomy of concepts and models of
the hacker behaviour that can be used by protection developers as a qualitative support
to validate the assumptions under which breakage of a protected asset is deemed eco-
nomically disadvantageous. In fact, relevant factors that determine the attack strategies
might be overlooked if an idealized hacker model that departs substantially from the
reality is assumed. Our model of the hacker behaviour, which is grounded on obser-
vations obtained from real attack tasks and supported by evidence collected in the
field, provides a solid basis on the expected attacker behaviour to protection develop-
ers. Moreover, our work identified a number of research directions and guidelines that
could substantially improve the practice of software protection. We have consolidated
such lessons learned in the form of a research agenda for software protection.
Despite the execution of multiple experiments in diversified contexts, we acknowl-
edge that we did not achieve theoretical saturation. However, this does not undermine
the validity of the presented approach, of our implementation, and of the current re-
sults. It is anyway the case that theoretical saturation of attacker tasks has a limited
temporal validity, because this subject, being an arms race, is a moving target. New
stronger attacks are elaborated at a constant pace, and this motivates to conceive
brand new protections, that are later subject to even more powerful attacks. Addi-
tional experiments are needed to achieve a wider comprehension of this phenomenon
and reach saturation regarding the current state of the art, and will be needed in the
future to keep up with this evolving topic. The proposed methodology supports the
inclusion of data from additional experiments, as this paper already demonstrates with
the inclusion of the second experiment.
It is worth noting that a study of this size (three and five attacked software, three
industrial teams and one practitioner) has quite limited general validity, as acknowl-
edged in Section 4 with our threat to validity analysis. Nonetheless, data collected in
these experiments are interesting and worth sharing with other researchers. Moreover,
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the preliminary results obtained in our qualitative study are expected to trigger future
quantitative studies, with stronger external validity, which may confirm or refute our
claims. One contribution of this paper is to set the key research questions, the key
concepts and the reference models for such future studies.
This paper extends a conference paper that presented the first experiment with
industrial case studies and its results [13]. This paper adds the second experiment, i.e.,
the public challenge. This extension is important for several reasons. First, it allows
us to broaden the coverage of the resulting taxonomy and models to more attack
scenarios: to a wider range of attackers, with different levels of expertise and different
preferences in terms of attack approaches, to a wider range of assets and protected
applications, and to more combinations of deployed protections. These extensions are
important because defenders of software assets need to defend against all possible attack
paths by all possible attackers at once. Secondly, it allows us studying the differences
in behavior observed in the two experiments, and the extent to which the resulting
taxonomy and models are impacted by including additional experiments. In addition
to the extension towards more attack scenarios, we also extended the original taxonomy
with the software elements that the hackers in both experiments considered in their
activities. This extension is useful to let defenders focus on the concrete features their
protections need to impact.
The paper is organized as follows. The qualitative analysis methodology used to
annotate the hacker reports is described in Section 2. The extracted taxonomy and
models are presented in Section 3. We discuss the research directions for the improve-
ment of existing protections and for the development of new ones that emerged from
our studies in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to related work, while Section 6 concludes
the paper and sketches our plans for future work.
2 Qualitative Analysis Method
We have collected qualitative data from two sources: (1) Professional Hackers; (2) Pub-
lic Challenge Winner. Professional hackers were involved in the attempt to break the
protections of three industrial applications, provided by the three industrial partners
of Aspire. The Public Challenge consists of eight small programs protected by some
combinations of Aspire protections. Those programs were made available on the chal-
lenge website to registered users. For each program, the first hacker able to break it
was granted a prize.
We used two distinct annotation methods with the two experiments, because an ini-
tial taxonomy of concepts, produced from the first experiment with professional hack-
ers, was available at the time when the public challenge experiment was conducted.
In particular, we have applied different coding approaches to the professional hacker
reports and to the public challenge report: the qualitative reports collected from Pro-
fessional Hackers were subjected to open coding and conceptualization, with the aim
of extracting a taxonomy of attack tasks and a set of models of the hackers’ behaviour.
The qualitative report collected from the Public Challenge winner has been annotated
with concepts taken from the taxonomy built in the first experiment (closed coding)
and when these were not sufficient, the taxonomy has been extended with new concepts
that emerged in the second experiment (open coding). The second experiment served
to confirm the taxonomy by adopting it in a new context, as well as an extension of the
initial taxonomy with concepts associated to the behaviours of a different category of
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Industrial UC Data Anti Remote Code Client-Server Virtualization WBC Binary Diversified
Obfusc Debug Attestation Mobility Splitting Obfusc Obfusc Crypto Libs
DemoPlayer × × × × ×
LicenseManager × × × × × ×
OTP × × ×
Table 1: Protections applied to each industrial use case.
Application C H Java C++ Total
DemoPlayer 2,595 644 1,859 1,389 6,487
LicenseManager 53,065 6,748 819 - 58,283
OTP 284,319 44,152 7,892 2,694 338,103
Challenge 1 134 8 - - 142
Challenge 2 86 8 - - 94
Challenge 3 90 8 - - 98
Challenge 4 118 8 - - 126
Challenge 5 109 8 - - 117
Challenge 6 201 8 - - 209
Challenge 7 156 8 - - 164
Challenge 8 70 8 - - 78
Table 2: Size of industrial case study applications and the Public Challenges applica-
tions in SLoC per file type, before the protection tool chain is applied.
hackers: those participating in the public challenge, who are typically non-professional
hackers.
2.1 Data Collection from Professional Hackers
The three industrial project partners, Nagravision, SafeNet and Gemalto, are world
market leaders in their digital security fields. They developed the case study software,
and in particular the client-side Android apps of which the security-sensitive parts
were implemented in native dynamically linked libraries that were protected by means
of the protection tool chain produced by the Aspire project. DemoPlayer is a media
player provided by Nagravision. It incorporates DRM (Digital Right Management)
that needs to be protected. LicenseManager is a software license manager provided
by SafeNet. OTP is a one time password authentication server and client provided by
Gemalto. Table 2 (top) shows the lines of code (measured by sloccount [42]) of the
three industrial case study applications. For each case study (first column), the table
reports the amount of C code (in ”*.c” and ”*.h” files, respectively), the Java code (in
”*.java” files) and the C++ code (in ”*.ccp” and ”*.c++” files). Each application was
protected by the configuration of protections that was deemed most effective in each
specific case by the corresponding company’s security experts, based on the security
requirements of their specific industrial use case. Table 1 lists the deployed protections.
The professional penetration testers involved in the industrial case studies work
for security companies that offer third party security testing services. The industrial
partners of the project resort routinely to such companies for the security assessment of
their products. Such assessments are carried out by hackers with substantial experience
in the field, equipped with state-of-the-art tools for reverse engineering, static analysis,
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debugging, tracing and profiling, etc. Moreover, these hackers are able to customize
existing tools, to develop and add plug-ins to existing tools, as well as to develop new
tools if needed. In our case, external hacker teams have been augmented/complemented
with/by internal professional hacker teams, consisting of security analysts employed
by the project’s industrial partners. The exact composition of the hacker teams, such
as the name and the number of the hacker participants could not be disclosed for
confidentiality reasons.
The task for the hacker teams consisted of obtaining access to some sensitive assets
secured by the protections. Specifically, the task for the DemoPlayer application was
to violate a specific DRM protection; for LicenseManager it was to forge a valid license
key; for OTP it was to successfully generate valid one time passwords without valid
credentials. For confidentiality reasons on the industrial use cases, programs could not
be shared among different companies and each hacker team only attacked the program
owned by the corresponding company.
The hacker team activities could not be traced automatically or through question-
naires. In fact, such teams ask for minimal intrusion into the daily activities performed
by their hackers and are only available to report their work in the form of a final, narra-
tive report. For instance, it was not acceptable for security companies to video record
industrial hackers while working, or to use screen capturing tools or other intrusive
measures to have additional information to compare the results from the reports to.
As a consequence, we had no choice but to adopt a qualitative analysis method.
Based on existing qualitative research techniques [17], we defined the qualitative anal-
ysis method to be adopted in our study, consisting of the following phases: (1) data
collection; (2) open coding; (3) conceptualization; (4) model analysis. Although some
of the practices that we have adopted are in common with grounded theory (GT) [18,
37], the following key practices of GT [36] could not be applied: immediate and contin-
uous data analysis, theoretical sampling, and theoretical saturation, because we had
no option to continue data sampling based on gaps in the inferred theory.
Although the final hacker reports are in a free format, we wanted to make sure
that some key information was included, in particular information that can provide
clues about the ongoing program comprehension process. Hence, before the involved
professional hackers started their task, we shared with them a report template where
we have asked them to cover the following points in their final attack report:
1. type of activities carried out during the attack: detailed indications about the type
of activities carried out to perform the attack and the proportion of time devoted
to each activity.
2. level of expertise required for each activity: which of the successful actions required
a lot of expertise, which could be done easily.
3. encountered obstacles: detailed description of the obstacles encountered during the
attack attempts. In particular, hackers were asked to report any software protec-
tion that they think was put into place to prevent the attack and that actually
represented a major obstacle for their work.
4. decisions made, assumptions, and attack strategies: description of the attack strat-
egy and how it was adjusted whenever it proved ineffective. Hackers were asked to
describe the initial attempts and the decisions (if any) to change the strategy and
to try alternative approaches.
5. exploitation on a large scale in the real world: for attacks that succeeded once in the
lab, attackers were asked to describe what work would be required to exploit them
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in the real world (i.e., on a large scale, on software running on standard devices
instead of on lab infrastructure, with other keys, etc.).
6. return / remuneration of the attack effort: quantification of the attack effort, if
possible economically, so as to provide an estimate of the kind of remuneration
that would justify the amount of work done to carry out the attack.
In particular, the second point refers to the level of expertise required by the task,
e.g., running an existing attack tool does not require a major expertise, while interpret-
ing complex tool output or customizing/extending the tool requires substantial higher
expertise.
Each industrial case study was available to hacker teams for a period of 30 days.
During that period they worked full-time on it. At the end of this period, hacker teams
delivered their reports. While, in general, attack reports covered the above points, not
all of the points are necessarily covered in all attack reports or with the same level
of details. In particular, quantitative data, such as the proportion of time devoted to
each activity, were never provided, whereas qualitative indications about several of the
suggested dimensions are present in all reports, though with different levels of verbosity
and detail. The reports themselves cannot be made public because of confidentiality
requirements. Only the academic Aspire project partners had access to all three reports.
2.2 Data Collection from Public Challenge Winner
The Public Challenge consisted of a set of eight small applications, written by Aspire
project members and protected by eight distinct combinations of Aspire protections.
Smaller applications were more appropriate for a public challenge, because we expected
mostly practitioners to participate, rather than professional hackers.
The eight applications, hereafter called challenges, have been made available on-
line to registered users who could download and attack them. Registration could be
done anonymously, as only a valid email address had to be provided. The first three
participants to break a challenge had their self-chosen user names listed next to that
challenge on the challenge web site, together with the timestamp on which the correct
solution was submitted. Furthermore, the first successful attacker of each challenge was
rewarded with a monetary prize of e200. To be eligible for this prize, a participant had
to agree to participate (through e-mail) in a post-mortem forensic interview, in which
she/he has been asked to describe how the challenge was attacked and broken, which
tools were used, what the general attack strategy was, etc. Furthermore, she/he had
to reveal her/his real identity to the organizers of the challenge to enable the pay out
of the prize. By implementing the Public Challenge in this way, we again aimed for
complementing the data collection of the industrial use cases. Whereas the industrial
hackers are white-hat professionals, the targeted audience of this Public Challenge and
its prize money was the amateur, hobby, and black-hat community. Also in this case,
collecting data from multiple types of attackers helps towards building more generally
applicable models.
We provided attackers with GNU/Linux binaries of all challenges in addition to An-
droid binaries, Android being the main demonstration platform of Aspire. By letting
the participants choose, hackers and reverse engineers who are skilled in GNU/Linux
have not been put off by the prospect of having to port their hacking tools and envi-
ronment to an Android environment.
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The asset to be protected in all the applications is a random string of 64 characters
in length, which we will refer to as the key. Users received individualized versions of the
application, with every generated binary containing a different key, and could request
up to three different instances of every challenge. Each instance has a unique key, and
the deployed protections are invoked with unique random seeds2 where applicable, such
that code looks different for each instance. As valid keys can contain both upper and
lower case characters and numbers, the search space is large enough that attackers
are not able to brute force the correct key. The command-line application checks its
first argument against this key, and prints out whether or not the argument matches
the key. Thus upon entering the correct key as input, it becomes clear if the attack
was successful or not. In seven challenges, the answer appears immediately, in one
challenge it appears after days only. The latter case was engineered to force attackers
to tamper with the code, such that the anti-tampering protections could be evaluated.
The attackers could then submit a combination of the identifier of the attacked binary
and the key as a solution to the challenge.
Table 3 provides an overview of deployed protections. Besides the indicated protec-
tions, all challenges are protected with randomized control-flow obfuscations (opaque
predicates, branch functions and function flattening), anti-callback stack checks, and
offline code guards. Table 2 (bottom) shows the eight applications’ source code sizes.
Whereas they are small in that respect, the protected binaries were much larger than
these source sizes hint at, because those binaries contain protection functionality on
top of the protected application code. The code sections in the binaries, from which
attackers start their attack, range from approximately 12kb to 5MB. As all code in
those sections is mingled by default by the Aspire protection tool chain, the attackers
cannot single out the application code from the protection code easily.
Even though the asset is the same in all challenges (i.e., a key with the same
function; obviously the key value differs from binary to binary), and the program I/O
behaviour is the same in all challenges, we have decided to tailor the source code of
each challenge to suit the protections that are applied in each of those challenges. We
did so because different protection combinations can trigger different attack paths, and
because different code features lend themselves to different forms of protections. Also
in this way, we aim to broaden our data collection in order to yield more generally
applicable models, in this case by ensuring that different attack paths are included in
the data collection.
For each of the challenges summarized in Table 3, the source code characteristics
and the challenge-specific protections are the following ones:
Ch 1: In this challenge, an array is constructed by a block of code that is protected
with an anti-debugging protection that prevents an attacker from attaching
his own debugger to study the internal operation of the program [1]. Next,
code mobility [7] is used to protect the XORing of this array with mobile data
(i.e., data that is not present in the static program binary, but is downloaded
from a secure server at run time). Mobile code also contains the invocation to
2 The random seed was not meant to decide what protection to deploy or in what variant.
The random seed is used by protections to initialize values, e.g., the value to use as key, and
to diversify the way certain protections are injected and obfuscated, such that the injected
code cannot be identified through trivial pattern matching. Nonetheless, we verified that the
randomization process did not change the code and execution patterns in such a way that
diversified versions required different ways to be attacked, as it would have altered the analysis
of the results.
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Table 3: Protections applied to each challenge (Ch).
the strncmp C function that checks the validity of the key, this hiding that
operation.
Ch 2: The key is split into 16 integers, each of which is encoded using Residue Number
Coding (RNC) [15]. The input to the program is also split into 16 integers, and
these integers are then compared with the RNC-encoded key.
Ch 3: This challenge uses RNC data obfuscation and anti-debugging.
Ch 4: The main function is protected by moving it into a virtual machine (VM): the
main function body is translated into bytecode that is interpreted by the VM,
instead of being executed directly.
Ch 5: The key is used as ciphertext for White Box Cryptography (WBC) with a fixed
key [43]. This is then “decrypted” when a challenge instance is generated, and
the decrypted key is stored in the challenge instance. Furthermore, the WBC
code has been protected with anti-debugging.
Ch 6: The key is checked in two parts: the first half of the key is checked byte per
byte. The code that checks the key performs a very long delay loop (two nested
loops, both of which only finish after looping through 264 values) and a sleep
of about 11 days after each character is checked. These delays are to encourage
the attackers to try to modify the binary to remove or shorten the delay to
verify the key, i.e., to tamper with the code, which is protected with Remote
Attestation (RA) [30]. The next part of the binary is protected using mobile
code, so that if the RA component detects tampering, the protection server can
trigger a tamper response in the code mobility component.
Ch 7: This challenge starts from code that has “ugly” control flow at the source level.
Then this code has binary control flow obfuscations applied, and is furthermore
protected with anti-debugging.
Ch 8: The code is protected with client-server code splitting [12], where each character
is sent individually to the server, and the client only asks for the correctness of
the next key character if the previous one was correct.
The Public Challenge was advertised on the reverse engineering sub-reddit, on
Twitter, in the institutions that partnered in the Aspire project, and in summer schools
to which they participated.
Five challenges were broken (in the order 5, 7, 2, 3, and 4) by the same hacker,
who participated in the post-mortem forensic interview. The content of the interview
represents the qualitative report, comprising several paragraphs dedicated to each one
of the five broken challenges as well as some general considerations and impressions
on the challenges, e.g., on how to prepare the attacks and activities shared among
challenges. After an initial email, asking for general explanations about the successful
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OPEN CODING PROCEDURE:
1. Open the report in Word and use Review → New Comment to add annotations
2. After reading each sentence, decide if it is relevant for the goal of the study, which is inves-
tigating “How Professional Hackers Understand Protected Code while Performing Attack
Tasks”. If it is relevant, select it and add a comment. If not, just skip it. Please, consider
that in some cases it makes sense to select multiple sentences at once, or fragments of
sentences instead of whole sentences.
3. For the selected text, insert a comment that abstracts the hacker activity into a general code
understanding activity. Whenever possible, the comment should be short (ideally, a label),
but in some cases a longer explanation might be needed. Consider including multiple levels
of abstractions (e.g., “use dynamic analysis, in particular debugging”). The codes used in
this step are open and free, but the recommendation is to use codes with the following
properties:
(a) use short text;
(b) use abstract concepts; if needed add also the concrete instances;
(c) as much as possible, try to abstract away details that are specific of the case study or
of the tools being used;
(d) revise previous codes based on new codes if better labels/names are found later for the
abstract concepts introduced earlier.
Fig. 1: Coding instructions shared among coders of the Professional Hackers report
attacks (“how did you find the keys?”, “which tools did you use?”, “how did you ap-
proach the different challenges?”, “which difficulties (if any) did you experience and
how did you tackle them?”), the interview proceeded with further requests of clarifica-
tions and explanations, based on the hacker’s replies. Examples of follow-up questions
are: “Could you estimate how much effort / time you spent per challenge?”, “How
did you know it was WBC?”, “For the seventh and third challenges, apart from the
checksums, did you experience any problems when attaching the debugger? If so, how
did you circumvent them; if not, which debugger did you use and how did you attach to
the program? (Did you notice that there were two processes running?)”, “How did you
know where to put the breakpoints?”. The interview was closed when the associated
report contained enough information to understand the attack strategy as well as the
technical details behind the five successful attacks.
The interview also confirmed that the participant who solved the public challenges
was indeed an experienced amateur hacker, with access to advanced, but publicly avail-
able tools. This participant, thus, fitted the intended target of the Public Challenge.
Considering that this profile differs from the professional hackers involved in the first
experiment, we aim for a substantial extension of the initial taxonomy built just on
industrial settings, by including data from two diverse settings.
2.3 Open Coding and Conceptualization (Professional Hacker Experiment)
Open coding was applied to the qualitative data collected from the Professional Hack-
ers. Open coding of the reports was carried out by each academic institution participat-
ing in the Aspire project. Coding by seven different coders was conducted autonomously
and independently. Only high level instructions have been shared among coders before
starting the coding activity, so as to leave maximum freedom to coders and to avoid
the introduction of any bias during coding. These general instructions are reported in
Figure 1.
The annotated reports obtained after open coding were merged into a single report
containing all collected annotations. We have not attempted to unify the various an-
11
notations because we wanted to preserve the viewpoint diversity associated with the
involvement of multiple coders operating independently from each other. Unification
is one of the main goals of the next phase, conceptualization.
Conceptualization was applied to the annotated data collected from the Profes-
sional Hackers. This phase consists of a manual model inference process carried out
jointly by all coders. The process involves two steps: (1) concept identification; (2)
model inference.
The goal of concept identification is to identify key concepts that coders used in
their annotations, to provide a unique label and meaning to such concepts and to
organize them into a concept hierarchy. The most important relation identified in this
step is the “is-a” relation between concepts, but other relations, such as aggregation
or delegation, might emerge as well. In this step, the main focus is a static, structural
view of the concepts that emerge from the annotations. The output is thus a so-called
“lightweight” ontology (i.e., an ontology where the structure is modelled explicitly,
while axioms and logical constraints are ignored).
The goal of model inference is to obtain a model with explanation and predictive
power. To this aim, the concepts obtained in the previous step are revised and the
following relations between pairs of concepts are conjectured, based on considerations
or observations formulated by the participants: (1) temporal relations (e.g., before);
(2) causal relations (e.g., cause); (3) conditional relations (e.g., condition for); (4)
instrumental relation (e.g., used to). Evidence is sought for such conjectures in the
annotations. It should be noted that relations are not based on the exact words used
in the reports. Concept relations are rather based on the meaning of participants
comments, so that a consistent model is inferred even if different participants used
different words to mean the same relation. The outcome of this step is a model that
typically includes a causal graph view, where edges represent causal, conditional and
instrumental relations, and/or a process view, where activities are organized temporally
into a graph whose edges represent temporal precedence. This step is deemed concluded
when the inferred model is rich enough to explain all the observations encoded in the
annotations of the hacker reports, as well as to predict the expected hacker behaviour
in a specific attack context, which depends on context factors such as the features
of the protected application, the applied protections, the assets being protected, the
expected obstacles to hacking.
Correspondingly, two joint meetings (over conference calls) have been organized
to carry out the two steps. During each meeting, the report with the merged codes
was read sentence by sentence and annotation by annotation. During such reading,
abstractions have been proposed by coders either for concept identification (step 1)
or for model inference (step 2). The proposed abstractions have been discussed; the
discussion proceeded until consensus was reached. During the process, whenever new
abstractions were proposed and discussed, the abstractions introduced earlier were
possibly revised and aligned with the newly introduced abstractions.
Although the conceptualization phase is intrinsically subjective, subjectivity was
reduced by: (1) involving multiple coders with different backgrounds and asking them
to reach consensus on the abstractions that emerged from codes; (2) keeping trace-
ability links between abstractions and annotations. Traceability links are particularly
important, since they provide the empirical evidence for the inference of a given con-
cept or relation. Availability of such traceability links allows coders to revise their
decisions later, at any point in time, and allows external inspectors of the model to un-
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CLOSED/OPEN CODING PROCEDURE:
1. Open the report in Word and use Review → New Comment to add annotations
2. After reading each sentence, decide if it is relevant for the goal of the experiment, which is
investigating “How Public Challenge Hackers Understand Protected Code while Performing
Attack Tasks”. If it is relevant, select it and add a comment. If not, just skip it. Please,
consider that in some cases it makes sense to select multiple sentences at once, or fragments
of sentences instead of whole sentences.
3. For the selected text, insert a comment that contains one or more concepts taken from the
attack taxonomy produced in the experiment with Professional Hackers. If no concept is
applicable, propose one or more new concepts and suggest their position (parents) in the
existing taxonomy.
Fig. 2: Coding instructions shared among coders of the Public Challenge report
derstand (and possibly revise/change) the connection between abstractions and initial
annotations.
2.4 Taxonomy Extension (Public Challenge Experiment)
The taxonomy extracted from the experiment with Professional Hackers was reused to
annotate the report collected from the Public Challenge. It has been extended with
new concepts when the existing ones were insufficient for the annotation of the report.
The closed/open coding procedure followed to annotate the Public Challenge report
is described in Figure 2. Whenever a relevant text fragment could not be annotated
by reusing an existing concept (closed coding), the annotator could recommend a new
concept for the given text fragment (open coding).
The annotated reports obtained after individual closed/open coding were merged
into a single report containing all collected annotations. Two consensus meetings have
been carried out over conference calls to reach a consensus on a unified annotation of the
Public Challenge report. During each consensus meeting, the report with the merged
codes was read sentence by sentence and annotation by annotation. The proposed
annotations with existing or new concepts have been discussed and the discussion
proceeded until consensus was reached. During the process, whenever new concepts
were approved, their position in the existing taxonomy was also discussed and decided
as well as their relations with other concepts in the taxonomy.
3 Results
Table 4 shows the number of annotations produced for the Professional Hacker reports
(top) and the Public Challenge winner report (bottom). The three case study reports
(indicated as P: DemoPlayer; L: LicenseManager; O: OTP) produced by Professional
Hackers have been annotated by seven annotators (indicated as A, B, C, D, E, F,
G) from the academic partners of Aspire. Each annotation is labelled by a unique
identifier having the following structure: [<case study> : <annotator> : <number>]
(e.g., [P:D:7]) to simplify traceability between inferred concepts and models on one side
and annotations supporting them on the other side. The reports have been processed in
the same order by all the annotators, that is P, L and O. The reports on the five broken
challenges produced from the interview with the Public Challenge winner have been
annotated by four teams of annotators (indicated as T1, T2, T3, T4), one from each
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Table 4: Number of annotations by annotator and by case study report.
Industrial Annotator
case study A B C D E F G Total
P 52 34 48 53 43 49 NA 279
L 20 10 6 12 7 18 9 82
O 12 22 NA 29 24 11 NA 98
Total 84 66 54 94 74 78 9 459
Public Annotator Team
challenge T1(A,G) T2(C,D) T3(B,F) T4(E) Total
C2 11 14 4 5 34
C3 3 9 2 3 17
C4 21 44 12 7 84
C5 10 12 3 3 28
C7 3 4 3 1 11
Common 22 46 9 14 91
Total 70 129 33 33 265
academic institution participating in the Aspire project. The composition of annotator
teams is reported in parentheses near to the team name.
In total, 459 annotations have been produced for the Professional Hacker reports.
Case study P received considerably more annotations than L and O, mostly because
of the amount and richness of the information available in this hacker report. The
number of annotations made by different annotators is quite consistent across the case
studies (NA = Not Available indicates that the annotator did not annotate that specific
report), with L showing the highest variability (min = 6; max = 20). For the Public
Challenge report, 265 annotations have been produced in total by the four teams,
with wide variability (min = 33; max = 129) indicating a spectrum of attitudes on the
amount of concepts used for each text fragment to be annotated. These 265 annotations
clearly form a relevant extension over the 459 annotations considered in our previous
work [13].
The Public Challenge annotations have been applied to both text describing a spe-
cific challenge and text describing general considerations concerning all the challenges.
General considerations cover aspects that are independent of the single challenge, like
environment preparation and use of analysis tools. Table 4 reports the number of
annotations associated to text of the report that was explicitly referred to a specific
challenge. It is possible to see how text concerning individual challenges has been heav-
ily annotated. The most complicated challenge to break, i.e., the fourth challenge that
used white box crypto, deserved a long description by the hacker and it was annotated
by teams with a number of annotations similar to that of the L and O industrial case
studies.
Annotators were the same for the two experiments. The difference in the annotation
procedure between the first and the second experiment (i.e., individual annotators
versus teams of annotators) is due to the slightly different settings between the two
experiments. In fact, in the second experiment annotators started from the existing
taxonomy, not from scratch, and they could benefit from the experience maturated in
14
annotating the first experiment reports. Teams were used in the second experiment to
anticipate some discussion within each team when annotating the reports, to allow for
an easier successive plenary meeting in which consensus was aimed for.
3.1 Identified Concepts
Figures 3 and 4, and 5 show the taxonomy of concepts resulting from the conceptual-
ization process carried out by the annotators. New concepts introduced in the Public
Challenge experiment are underlined; concepts emerged in both experiments are in
boldface.
The top concepts in the taxonomy correspond to the main notions that are useful
to describe the hacker activities. These are: Obstacle, Analysis / reverse engineering,
Attack strategy, Attack step, Workaround, Weakness, Asset, Background knowledge,
Tool, Software elements, Difficulty (the last one, Difficulty, was introduced only when
the Public Challenge data have been processed). The taxonomy in OWL format is
available online at: http://selab.fbk.eu/ceccato/hacker-study/EMSE2017.owl.
To help readability, in the graphical representation of our taxonomy, concepts are
ordered according to possible phases, e.g the preparation comes ideally first, then some
code understanding is done, the attack attempt takes place before the evaluation of
the attack result. We did not opt for a more formal ordering, such as the number
of concepts or the size of reports, because it would have been arbitrary or based on
sensitive information that we could not disclose. Moreover, it would be difficult to keep
a consistent ordering approach in future experiments, possibly conducted by other
researchers, where data sharing might be still difficult because of confidentiality issues.
3.1.1 Obstacle
As expected, in the Obstacle hierarchy (Figure 3) we find the protections that are
applied to the software to prevent the hacker attacks (under concept Protection). We
observe that this is not the only kind of obstacle reported by hackers.
In particular, the Execution environment may also be a major impediment to the
completion of an attack. In a report we read “Aside from the [omissis]3 added in-
conveniences [due to protections], execution environment requirements can also make
an attacker’s task much more difficult. [omissis] Things such as limitations on net-
work access and maximum file size limitations caused problems during this exercise”;
on this part one coder annotated [P:F:7]: “General obstacle to understanding [by dy-
namic analysis]: execution environment (Android: limitations on network access and
maximum file size)”.
3.1.2 Difficulty
Most difficulties (see Difficulty hierarchy in Figure 3) are problems encountered by
the hacker while performing the Public Challenge, due to lack of knowledge (“This
3 With the placeholder “[omissis]” we indicate that a part of the text is not reported either
because it cannot be disclosed for confidentiality reasons or because it is not relevant since we
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Fig. 3: Taxonomy of extracted concepts (part I): the analysis methods and tools hackers
may use (Analysis / reverse engineering, Tool), weaknesses in design and coding of the
application to protect that may help the hacker tasks (Weakness), the difficulty hackers
may experience when trying to perform an attack task (Difficulty), the protections a
defender can place to limit certain attack steps (Obstacle), and other high-level concepts
that characterize the hacking scenarios (Asset, Attack strategy, Background knowledge,
Workaround). * indicates multiple inheritance; new concepts added during the second
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Fig. 4: Taxonomy of extracted concepts (part II): the attack steps hackers may perform.
They include the operations to prepare the attack (Prepare attack) and decide how to
mount it (Build the attack strategy), the tasks to understand the software through
reverse engineering the application code (Reverse engineer software and protection),
the modifications to code and executions to tamper with the application (Tamper with
code and execution), and the tasks to evaluate whether the attack was successful or
not and learn from errors (Analyse attack result). * indicates multiple inheritance;
new concepts added during the second qualitative experiment are underlined; concepts
emerged in both experiments are in boldface.
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was my first major encounter with ARM arch and Linux platform”) or portability
(“The problem as far as I could gather was inside libwebsockets processing, probably
because of my device setup”). Another difficulty (formerly classified as an Obstacle [13])
is represented by Tool limitations, for which we can find annotated sentences such as
[P:A:33]: “Attack step: overcome limitation of an existing tool by creating an ad hoc
communication means” in the professional hacker reports.
3.1.3 Analysis / reverse engineering
The Analysis / reverse engineering hierarchy (see Figure 3) is quite rich and interesting.
It includes advanced techniques that are part of the state of the art of the research
in code analysis, such as Symbolic execution / SMT solving; Dependency analysis;
Statistical analysis. Of course, hackers are well aware of the most recent advances in
the field of code analysis.
Control flow reconstruction and Diffing were added when processing the report
from the Public Challenge. In particular, the Public Challenge hacker compared (using
the utility diff) the original source code of a publicly available interpreter with the
decompiled code obtained from the challenge, to detect any modification that could
have been made to that interpreter, that was in fact re-used in the Aspire project to
protect the challenge (“I was cross-referencing the original [omissis] source code with
challenge’s decompilation to spot the differences in processing [omissis] file”) .
3.1.4 Attack step
The central concept that emerged from the hacker reports is Attack step, whose hier-
archy is shown in Figure 4. An Attack step represents each single activity that must be
executed when implementing a chosen Attack strategy. The top level concepts under
Attack step correspond to the major activities carried out by hackers. Hackers that
opted for dynamic attack strategies first of all prepare the attack (concept Prepare at-
tack) to ensure the code can be executed under their control. Then, they usually spend
some time understanding the code and its protections by means of a variety of activities
that are sub-concepts of Reverse engineer software and protections in the taxonomy.
Once they have gained enough knowledge about the software under attack, they build
a strategy (concept Build attack strategy, they execute any necessary, preliminary task
(concept Prepare attack and they actually execute the attack by manipulating the soft-
ware statically or at run time (concept Tamper with code and execution. Finally, they
analyse the attack results and decide how to proceed (concept Analyse attack result).
Reverse engineer software and protections The attack step Reverse engineer
software and protections includes several activities in common with general program un-
derstanding (see Figure 4), but it also includes some hacking-specific activities. For in-
stance, recognizing the occurrence of program behaviours that are not expected for the
software under attack (concept Recognize anomalous/unexpected behaviour ; [P:A:27]
“Identified strange behaviour compared to the expected one (from their background
knowledge)”) is important, since it may point to computations that are unrelated with
the software business logic and are there just to implement some protection. It might
also point to variants of well known protections ([P:E:17] “Infer behaviour knowing
AES algo details”). Identification of sensitive assets in the software (concept Iden-
tify sensitive assets; [P:D:4] “prune search space of interesting code, using very basic
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static (meta-) information”) and of points of attack (concept Identify points of attack ;
[P:E:14] “Analyse traces to locate output generation”) are other examples of hacking-
specific program understanding activities. The Identify protection sub-hierarchy is also
unique to code hacking and can take advantage of similarities with previously attacked
applications or with manual inspection of the protection logic (“they calculated check-
sums of a certain sections of binary and compared it with input (which was divided by
dwords)”).
Build attack strategy When iteratively building the attack strategy (concept Build
attack strategy, Figure 4), it is important to be able to reduce the scope of the attack to
a manageable portion of the code. This key activity is expressed through the concept
Limit scope of attack ([O:D:5] “use symbolic operation to focus search”). Within such
narrowed scope, hackers evaluate the alternatives and choose the path of least resistance
(concepts Evaluate and select alternative steps / revise attack strategy and Choose path
of least resistance; see, e.g., the sentence: “As the libraries are obfuscated, static analysis
with a tool such as IDA Pro is difficult at best”, annotated as [P:D:5] “discard attack
step/paths”). When possible, they try to reuse an attack strategy that worked in the
past (“I used same strategy to extract the key”).
Tamper with code and execution Another remarkable difference from general
program understanding is the substantial amount of code and execution manipulation
carried out by hackers. Indeed, a core attack step consists of the alteration of the nor-
mal flow of execution (concept Tamper with code and execution in Figure 4). This is
achieved in many different ways, as apparent from the richness of the hierarchy rooted
at Tamper with code and execution. Some of them are hacking-specific and reveal a lot
about the typical attack patterns. For instance, activity Replace API functions with
reimplementation is carried out to work around a protection, by replacing its imple-
mentation with a fake implementation by the hackers ([P:F:49] “New attack strategy
based on protection API analysis: replace API functions with a custom reimplementa-
tion to be done within the debugging tool”). Activity Tamper with data is carried out
to alter the program state to defeat a protection (sentence “to set a fake value in vir-
tual CPU registers in order to deceive the debugged application”, annotated as [O:D:11]
“tamper with data to circumvent triggering protection”). Out of context execution is
carried out to run the code being targeted by an attack, e.g., a protected function, in
isolation, as part of a manually crafted main program (sentence “write own loader for
[omissis] library”, annotated as [L:D:20] “adapt and create environment in which to
execute targeted code out of context”). Moreover, hackers tamper with the execution
to undo the effects of a protection (concept Undo protection), often to reverse engineer
the clear code from the obfuscated one (concepts Deobfuscate the code, Convert code
to standard format, and Obtain clear code after code decryption at run time). When
possible, they prefer to bypass a protection rather than undoing it (concept Bypass
protection used to annotate the following sentences from the Public Challenge report:
“I was successful in overriding checksum mechanism”; ”I [omissis] put breakpoints after
they executed so I simply caught expected results”).
3.1.5 Software elements
To put the concepts that describe the program comprehension processes and activities
in perspective, it is interesting to know the artifacts on which attackers focus in pro-
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Fig. 5: Taxonomy of extracted concepts (part III): software elements. * indicates mul-
tiple inheritance; new concepts added during the second qualitative experiment are
underlined; concepts emerged in both experiments are in boldface.
grams, i.e., the structures, components and elements they consider as relevant program
aspects to interpret and manipulate in their reverse-engineering and tampering attacks.
To that extent, we identified all the Software elements that the attackers mentioned in
their reports and interview responses. Figure 5 provides a taxonomy of the extracted
terms, with four top-level concepts.
The concept Code representation and structure contains the forms and representa-
tions of software that attackers consider, varying from very concrete (e.g., Core dump)
to more abstract (Decompiled code), from static (Control flow graph and Call Graph)
to dynamic (Trace), and the structural elements they consider at those different levels
and in the different forms. The feature Size plays an important role, because attackers
consider the apparent size of different components (ranging from the whole applica-
20
tion under attack to the size of individual functions) for deciding on the best attack
strategy.
Semantics of the code structures in the representations is often derived from, and
attached to, specific operations. Four relevant ones are covered by the Operation con-
cept. Some are generic, like Function call, Memory access and System call. XOR opera-
tions are considered specifically in the context of cryptographic primitives and attacks
thereon.
While performing dynamic attacks steps, e.g., by observing program execution with
a debugger or by analysing execution traces, the attackers observe and track different
aspects and features of the dynamic program data and states. Those are covered in the
concept Data and program state. Most are generic because they are relevant in almost
all programs; other concepts, such as those evolving around differences, correlation, and
randomness are again related to cryptography, where those aspects are understood to
relate to weaknesses, e.g., with respect to side-channel attacks.
Finally, the concept Static data covers all forms of extra information (i.e., not just
the actual static code and data that is part of the running program) that attackers can
extract from the statically available attack objects, i.e., from the executable files.
3.2 Comparison between Professional Hackers and Public Challenge Winner
Here, we present the differences that we spotted in the concepts identified between the
two experiments. As such, this difference should not be interpreted as representative
of the general difference between public challenges and professional industrial hackers.
Table 5 shows the taxonomy concepts that are used to annotate uniquely the pro-
fessional hacker reports, uniquely the public challenge report, or both. The number of
concepts is computed by simply counting the leaves in the taxonomy. The numbers
indicate a substantial degree of taxonomy reuse in the second experiment (41%), de-
spite the completely different setting, which involved small, ad-hoc programs instead of
large, industrial applications, and an amateur hacker versus professionals. This means
the original ontology, emerged from the first experiment [13], included part of the core
concepts required to annotate hacker reports. The second experiment was effective in
adding new concepts, missing from the original ontology.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 depict in boldface the 53 concepts common to the two ex-
periments. All top level concepts (except Difficulty, which was added in the second
experiment as a similar but distinct Obstacle) are used to annotate both experiments.
This means that several high level categories of activities were identified in both exper-
iments, including Analysis / reverse engineering, Attack strategy, Attack step, Back-
ground knowledge, Tool. Looking deeper into the taxonomy, we can notice that several
nested concepts, including several leaf concepts, are shared between the two experi-
ments. String / name analysis, Pattern matching, Dynamic analysis and in particular
Debugging are core techniques for Analysis / reverse engineering that were used in
both experiments.
Among the Attack step’s (see Figure 4) sub-concepts, most of the first and second
level ones are found in both experiments. Hackers in both experiments performed
activities like: Reverse engineer software and protections, Understand the software,
Identify sensitive asset, Identify points of attack, Identify protection, Reverse engineer
the code, Prepare attack, Customize/extend tool, Create new tool for the attack, Build
workaround, Assess effort, Tamper with code and execution, Undo protection, Tamper
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with execution, Tamper with code statically, Brute force attack, Build the attack strategy,
Evaluate and select alternative step / revise attack strategy, Limit scope of attack,
Analyse attack result, Make hypothesis.
Among the deeply nested concepts shared between the two experiments, it is in-
teresting to notice the importance of basic, low level binary code analysis techniques
(concepts Disassemble the code, Deobfuscate the code), which are standard toolkit parts
in any successful hacker attack. The concept Tamper with data is also interesting. In
fact, looking at the text fragments annotated with this concepts, a clear pattern of
tampering with the data emerges: hackers set a breakpoint in the binary code and be-
fore resuming the execution they alter some critical data (the value of a checksum, of
a key, etc.) to test some hypothesis or expose some anomalous behaviour. Breakpoint
setting and execution state manipulation seems yet another important basic technique
that any hacker is willing to use. Hence the importance of Anti-debugging protections,
which hackers tried to defeat in both experiments (see concept Disable anti-debugging
in Figure 4, an Attack step common to both experiments). From the point of view of
the attack strategy, important low level concepts emerged in both experiments, such as
Make hypothesis on protection and Choose path of least resistance. In the attempt to
save and optimize the attack effort, hackers speculate on protections even when they
have not much evidence about them and choose the attack path that requires minimum
effort based on the hypothesized protection.
Table 5 (top) shows the concepts uniquely used to annotate the professional hacker
reports. Some quite advanced analysis and reverse engineering techniques have been
used only by professional hackers. For instance: Symbolic execution / SMT solving,
Crypto analysis, Data flow analysis, Differential data analysis, Correlation analysis.
The explanation for this might be twofold: on one hand, these are techniques that
require specialist competences and dedicated tools, which probably are unavailable to
the typically non-professional hacker engaged in the Public Challenge. In our case,
indeed, the Public Challenge was solved by a practitioner, whose interest in reverse
engineering is purely a hobby. On the other hand, the industrial applications protected
in the first experiment were much more complex than the small challenges used in the
second experiment (see Table 2): they were larger, they consisted of dynamically linked
libraries that provided complex functionality to external applications instead of being
a main binary that only performs command-line input-output, and more protections
were combined in them. Moreover, the assets protected in the industrial applications
are substantially different from the asset (a key) protected in the public challenge,
since they consist of an entire functionality (e.g., authentication) of the industrial
applications. The higher complexity of the software and the assets protected in the
first experiment offers another explanation for the need of more sophisticated and
advanced tools and techniques.
Among the attack steps uniquely executed by professional hackers, a common fea-
ture seems to be the time and effort devoted to preparation activities. Professional
hackers performed several attack preparation activities that were not carried out in the
public challenge, such as: Prepare the environment, Preliminary understanding of the
software, Choose/evaluate alternative tool, Port tool to target execution environment,
Customize execution environment, Recreate protection in the small. This amounts for a
lot of work, which is documented in detail in the professional hacker reports and that
was necessary to port the attacks. In part such necessity might be due to the com-
plexity of the industrial applications, which cannot be faced directly using off-the-shelf
tools, with no preparation or customization. Observing and manipulating dynamically
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Table 5: Comparison of concepts emerged in the two experiments
Unique to professional hackers 76 concepts (45%)
Asset, Black-box analysis, Clear data in memory, Code representation and structure,
Condition, Confirm hypothesis, Constant, Control flow flattening, Convert code to stan-
dard format, Core dump, Correlation analysis, Correlation between observed values,
Crypto analysis, Customize execution environment, Data flow analysis, Decrypt code
before executing it, Dependency analysis, Difference between observed values, Differ-
ential data analysis, Disassembler, Dynamic data, Emulator, Execution environment,
File format analysis, File name, Function argument, Function pointer, Global func-
tion pointer table, Identify API calls, Identify assets by naming scheme, Identify assets
by static meta info, Identify input / data format, Identify output generation, Iden-
tify thread/process containing sensitive asset, Java library, Knowledge on execution
environment framework, Library / module, Limit scope of attack by static meta info,
Limitations from operating system, Make hypothesis on reasons for attack failure, Mem-
ory access, Memory dump, Meta info, Monitor public interfaces, Obtain clear code after
code decryption at run time, Opaque predicates, Operation, Out of context execution,
Overcome protection, Port tool to target execution environment, Preliminary under-
standing of the software, Profiler, Profiling, Randomness - random number, Recreate
protection in the small, Reference to API function / imported and exported function,
Register, Replace API functions with reimplementation, Round / repetition / loop, Run
analysis, Run software in emulator, Shared library, Socket, Static data, Statistical anal-
ysis, Switch statement, Symbolic execution / SMT solving, System call, Tamper with
execution environment, Tool limitations, Trace, Tracer, Tracing, Understand persistent
storage / file / socket, Workaround, XOR operation
Unique to public challenge 23 concepts (14%)
Bypass protection, Checksum, Code guard, Control flow graph reconstruction, Debug/-
superfluous features not removed, Decompile the code, Decompiler, Difficulty, Diffing,
Lack of knowledge, Lack of knowledge on platform, Lack of portability, main(), Man-
ually assist the disassembler, Recognize similarity with already analysed protected ap-
plication, Reuse attack strategy that worked in the past, Stack pointer, stderr, Tamper
detection, Understand protection logic, Virtualization, Weak crypto, Write tool sup-
ported script
Both experiments 70 concepts (41%)
Analyse attack result, Analysis / reverse engineering, Anti-debugging, Assess effort, At-
tack failure, Attack step, Attack strategy, Background knowledge, Basic block, Brute
force attack, Build the attack strategy, Build workaround, Bytecode, Call graph, Choose
path of least resistance, Clear key, Clues available in plain text, Control flow graph, Cre-
ate new tool for the attack, Customize/extend tool, Data and program state, Debugger,
Debugging, Decompiled code, Deobfuscate the code, Disable anti-debugging, Disassem-
ble the code, Disassembled code, Disassembler, Dynamic analysis, Evaluate and select
alternative step / revise attack strategy, File, Function / routine, Function call, Identify
code containing sensitive asset, Identify points of attack, Identify protection, Identify
sensitive asset, Initialization function, In-memory data structure, Limit scope of at-
tack, Make hypothesis, Make hypothesis on protection, Obfuscation, Obstacle, Pattern
matching, Prepare attack, Process / parent-child relation, Program counter, Program
input and output, Protection, Recognizable library, Recognize anomalous/unexpected
behaviour, Reverse engineer software and protections, Reverse engineer the code, Size,
Software element, Static analysis, String, String / name analysis, Tamper with code
and execution, Tamper with code statically, Tamper with data, Tamper with execu-




linked Android libraries in action requires a much more specialized environment than
doing the same on a simple command-line Linux application. Whereas a more or less
standard Linux setup suffices for the latter, a standard Android setup offers very lit-
tle support to attackers. Another explanation might be that professional hackers are
used to think in terms of attack automation. They want their attacks to be repeatable
deterministically by anyone, rather than being the result of hardly reproducible, man-
ually executed steps. Hence, they spend some time preparing tools and environment
to achieve such level of reproducibility.
There are also a few tampering activities that were carried out exclusively by profes-
sional hackers, among which: Tamper with execution environment, Replace API func-
tions with reimplementation, Out of context execution. These are all advanced and
sophisticated tasks that require deep knowledge and competence. In fact, tampering
with the execution environment often involves patching the operating system kernel or
developing a new one. Reimplementing API functions also refers typically to operat-
ing system level functions that provide basic services and that the attacker wants to
replace. Being able to execute a protection mechanism in isolation requires the capa-
bility to isolate some functions, mock (some of) the library calls involved and develop
a driver that can run the extracted code in isolation. All these activities may be out
of reach for non-professional hackers and may pay off only when complex industrial
applications are being attacked.
Regarding the software elements that are uniquely used by the professional hack-
ers, it suffices to observe that they mostly correspond to the activities they uniquely
reported. Most analysis or tampering techniques target specific kinds of software struc-
tures or components. So those structures and components occur in a report when the
result or trigger of a discussed attack step is mentioned.
Table 5 (bottom) shows the concepts uniquely used to annotate the public challenge
report. A new top level hierarchy emerged, rooted at concept Difficulty and including
among others Lack of knowledge and Lack of portability. This concept indicates a
problem encountered by hackers during their work (e.g., due to their limited knowledge
about a given platform), rather than an Obstacle placed there by the defenders to
protect the applications or known to be part of the environment, which hence provides
some implicit form of protection. The higher relevance of difficulties vs. obstacles in
the Public Challenge indicates a non-professional, occasional involvement of public the
challenge hacker in attack tasks (confirmed in the interview). Indeed, the winner of the
public challenges seems to have quite a different profile than professional hackers.
On the other hand, professional hackers work in team, where the lack of knowledge
in a specific field may be compensated by some other members. Moreover, professional
hackers have been explicitly selected by the industrial partners because of their specific
expertise in attacking their applications. A lack of knowledge or lack of portability,
which highlights the impossibility to execute the target application on their systems,
were inadmissible.
Some obstacles and weaknesses are specific of the challenges designed for the Public
Challenge experiment, such as the Protections Virtualization and Checksum, and the
Weaknesses Debug/superfluous features not removed and Weak crypto. That’s why
they appear only in the Public Challenge annotations.
Similarly, some software elements were uniquely mentioned by the Public Chal-
lenge hacker, such as the main() function and stderr. This is of course due to the
nature of the applications he attacked: simple program binaries that feature a main
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function and standard command-line input and output, versus libraries as attacked by
the professional hackers.
Some attack steps performed exclusively by the Public Challenge hacker seem to
indicate an attempt to minimize the attack effort by performing several attack steps
manually, rather than trying to automate them (concept Manually assist the disas-
sembler), by using functionalities immediately available from tools (concept Write
tool supported script) and by trying to bypass rather than undo the protections (con-
cept Bypass protection). This confirms a different attitude of Public Challenge hackers
vs. professional hackers with respect to preparation and automation of the attack: the
former try to reuse what’s available in tools and compensate for the missing function-
alities with manual activities, while the latter spend substantial time preparing the
environment and tools for the attack and automating the attack steps. Application
size is also a decisive factor that certainly impacted the attack effort minimization
choices by the Public Challenge hacker and the professional hackers. The successfully
attacked Public Challenge applications were much smaller in size and provided much
less functionality than the industrial use cases. This matters because manual and au-
tomated attacks scale differently: automation requires a large initial effort to develop
tools and scripts. When attacking small applications, in which the occurrences of pro-
tection code fragments are by definition limited, the initial automation effort is likely
not worthwhile. For small applications, the lack of scalability of manual tampering
and information gathering methods is simply not problematic and does not warrant an
initial investment in automation.
External factors also affect this different behaviour. Indeed, in the Public Challenge
the reward is granted to the first hacker that succeeds in breaking a challenge, therefore,
learning and generalizing from the attack tasks and improving their attack arsenal is
not their major goal. On the other hand, professional hackers were asked to describe
with proper level of details the protection techniques identified and their weaknesses.
Moreover, they are usually required (and paid for) writing reports, thus they collect
enough information for a complete document. There seems to be also some learning
going on for the Public Challenge hacker when moving from one challenge to the next
one, as apparent from the following Public Challenge exclusive concepts: Recognize
similarity with already analysed protected application, Reuse attack strategy that worked
in the past.
3.3 Inferred Models
To help readability with a not too heavy presentation and to focus on the most in-
teresting findings, we decided not to present and comment all the temporal, causal,
conditional and instrumental relations that have been inferred from the hacker reports
and their annotations. Since some temporal relations have already been commented
during the presentation of the taxonomy of concepts, we do not include this kind of
relations. For what concerns the other three kinds of relations emerged during the dis-
cussion, we have grouped them by the kind of hacker activity they represent. Hence,
they are presented as part of four models: (1) a model of how hackers understand the
software and identify sensitive assets (shown in Figure 6); (2) a model of how they
make or confirm a hypothesis, to build their attack strategy (Figure 7); (3) a model
of how they choose, customize and create new tools (Figure 8); (4) a model of how
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Fig. 6: Model of hacker activities related to understanding the software and identifying
sensitive assets
they defeat protections by bypassing them, by building workarounds, by overcoming
protections with other means, and by undoing them (Figure 9).
The models produced after the experiment with professional hackers have been
compared with the new concepts and annotations created in the Public Challenge ex-
periment. It was not necessary to introduce any major change due to the new concepts
and annotations, which indicates the general validity and applicability of the original
models. A few minor extensions were necessary to accommodate some new concepts
introduced after the Public Challenge and relevant for the inferred models. They are
commented below at the end of each model description.
3.3.1 How hackers understand protected software
Let us consider the first model, shown in Figure 6. Hackers carry out understanding
activities with the goal of identifying the sensitive assets in the software that are the
target of their attacks. Ultimately, identification of such sensitive assets allows hackers
to narrow down the scope of the attack to a small code portion, where their efforts
can be focused in the next attack phase (see the “cause” relation in Figure 6). In this
process, (static / dynamic) program analysis and reverse engineering play a dominant
role. They are used to understand the software, identify sensitive assets, and to limit the
scope of the attack (see “used to” relation in Figure 6). For instance, dynamic analysis of
IO system calls is used to limit the scope of the attack ([L:D:24] “prune search space for
interesting code by studying IO behavior, in this case system calls”), because some IO
operations are performed in the proximity of the protected assets. String analysis is used
for the same purpose ([L:D:26] “prune search space for interesting code by studying
static symbolic data, in this case string references in the code”), because some specific
constant strings are referenced in the proximity of sensitive assets. Tampering with the
execution is also a way to identify sensitive assets ([O:E:5] “static analysis + dynamic
code injection to get the crypto key”). When libraries with well known functionalities
are recognized, hackers get important clues on their use for asset protection (“condition
for” relation in Figure 6, based on annotations such as [O:E:6] “static analysis: native
lib is using java library for persistence giving clues on data stored to attacker”).
The model in Figure 6 was applied successfully to the public challenge annotations,
without any need for extensions. Based on this model, we expect the hackers’ task
to become harder to carry out when program analysis and reverse engineering are
inhibited and when tampering of the program execution is not allowed. In fact, these
are the core activities executed to identify sensitive assets and limit the attack scope.
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Fig. 7: Model of hacker activities related to making / confirming hypotheses and build-
ing the attack strategy
Hiding the libraries that are involved in the protection of the assets, not just the
protection itself, seems also important to stop / delay hackers.
3.3.2 How hackers build attack strategies
Figure 7 shows a model of how hackers come to the formulation and validation of
hypotheses about protections, and how this eventually leads to the construction of
their attack strategy. Hypothesis making requires (see “cause” relations in Figure 7)
running (static / dynamic) program analyses and interpreting the results by applying
background knowledge on how software protection and obfuscation typically work (e.g.,
[O:E:4] “static analysis to detect anti-debugging protections”). Identifying protections
or libraries involved in protections is also an important prerequisite to be able to
formulate hypotheses. When an attack attempt fails (see “condition for” relation on
the left in Figure 7), the reasons for the failure often provide useful clues for hypothesis
making (sentence “As the original process is already being ptraced, this prevents a
debugger, which typically uses the ptrace system, from attaching”, annotated as [P:A:50]
“Guess: avoid the attachment of another debugger”).
To confirm the previously formulated hypotheses, further analyses are run and in-
terpreted based on background knowledge (see “cause” relations connected to Confirm
hypothesis). Pattern matching is also useful to confirm hypotheses ([P:F:26] “Repeated
execution patterns are identified and matched against repeated computations that are
expected to be carried out by the relevant code”; [P:D:25] “mapping of observed (sta-
tistical) patterns to a priori knowledge about assumed functionality”). Another activity
that contributes to the confirmation of previously formulated hypothesis is the creation
of a small program that replicates the conjectured protection ([P:F:47] “Understanding
is carried out on a simpler application having similar (anti-debugging) protection”).
Once hypotheses about the protections are formulated and validated, an attack
strategy can be defined. This requires all the information gathered before, includ-
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ing the results of the analyses, background knowledge, identified assets and identified
protections (see “cause” relations connected to Build the attack strategy). Another im-
portant input for the definition of the (revised) attack strategy is the observation of
anomalous or unexpected behaviours (sentence “[omissis] It seems that the coredump
didn’t contain all of the process’ memory [omissis]”, annotated as [P:C:31] “Anomaly
detected causing doubt in the tool’s abilities: change attack strategy”). In fact, unex-
pected crashes or missing data might point to previously unknown protections that
are triggered by the hackers’ attempts or to tool limitations. In turn, this leads to
the definition of alternative attack paths. Background knowledge plays a major role in
strategy building, in particular knowledge about weaknesses (e.g., Debug/superfluous
features not removed and Weak crypto) when these are recognized in the software (“I
did the simplest thing possible, the brute-forcing, and the way crypto worked (pro-
cessing 16 byte blocks independently of each other), meant it was time-inexpensive
to do it”). Similarity with previously attacked applications was also found to be an
important factor in strategy building in the public challenge experiment (see “cause”
relation between Recognize similarity with already analysed protected application and
Build the attack strategy).
An important condition that determines the feasibility of an attack strategy is the
amount of effort required to implement it (see “condition for” relation connected to
Build the attack strategy). Hence, effort assessment is one of the key abilities of hackers,
who have to continuously estimate the effort needed to implement an attack, contrast-
ing it with the expected chances of success ([P:D:51] “assessment of effort needed to
extend existing tool to make it provide a workaround around a protection, i.e., de-
feat the protection that prevents an attack step, in this case based on the concepts of
the protection”). Even if potentially effective, attack strategies that are deemed as ex-
tremely expensive (e.g., manual reverse engineering and tampering of the code binary)
are often discarded to favour approaches that are regarded as more cost-effective.
The validity of the model in Figure 7 was confirmed by the public challenge exper-
iment, which has provided additional evidence for most of the relations in the model.
Only a minor extension was necessary to accommodate a new concept that emerged
from the public challenge annotations: the relation between Recognize similarity with
already analysed protected application and Build the attack strategy.
Based on the model shown in Figure 7, we can notice that hypothesis making and
attack strategy construction are inhibited by the same factors that inhibit software
understanding and sensitive asset identification. In addition, a further factor comes
into play: the estimated effort to implement an attack. Hence, even protections that
can be eventually broken play potentially a key role in preventing attacks, if they
contribute to increase the effort required for attacking the target sensitive assets.
3.3.3 How hackers choose and customize tools
Hackers extensively use existing tools for their attacks. An important core set of the
hackers’ competences is deep knowledge of tools: when and how to use them; how to
customize them. Figure 8 shows how hackers evaluate, choose, configure, customize,
extend and create new tools (see also sub-concepts of Customize/extend tool, including
Write tool supported script). The starting point is usually the result of some analysis
and/or the observation of some specific obstacle, which leads to the identification of
candidate tools (see “cause” relations in Figure 8). Then, a key factor that determines
both tool selection and customization is the execution environment and platform. Other
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Fig. 8: Model of hacker activities related to choosing, customizing, and creating new
tools
important factors are known limitations of existing tools, which might be inapplicable
to a specific platform or application ([P:A:23] “[omissis] Attack step: dynamic analysis
with another tool on the identified parts to overcome the limitation of Valgrind”), as
well as observed failures of previously attempted dynamic analysis ([P:C:38] “Experi-
ment with tool options to try to circumvent failures of the tool”), which may suggest
alternative approaches and tools (see “condition for” relations on the left in Figure 8).
Once tools are selected and customized, they are used to find patterns, by running
further analyses on the protected code, or they are used directly to undo protections
and mount the attacks (see “used to” relations in the middle of Figure 8). When
existing tools are insufficient for the hackers’ purposes, new tools might be constructed
from scratch. This is potentially an expensive activity, so it is carried out only if
existing tools cannot be adapted for the purpose in any way and if alternative tools or
attack strategies are not possible. One case where such tool construction from scratch
tends to be cost-effective is when hackers want to execute a part of the software out
of context, to better understand its protections (see “used to” relation connected to
Out of context execution). In fact, this usually amounts to writing scaffolding code
fragments that execute parts of the application or library under attack in an artificial,
hacker-controlled, context ([L:E:17] “write custom code to load-run native library”).
The model in Figure 8 was fully applicable to the public challenge annotations,
with no need for any extensions. The public challenge experiment provided substantial
further support to the general validity of this model. The model shows that tools play a
dominant role in the implementation of attacks. Hence, software protections should be
designed and realized based on an amount of knowledge of tools and of their potential
that should be as deep and sophisticated as the hackers’ one. Preventing out of context
execution is another important line of defence against existing and new tools.
3.3.4 How hackers defeat protections
The actual execution of an attack against a protection aims at defeating it, by bypassing
it, building a workaround, undoing the protection completely, or overcoming it in some
other way. Figure 9 shows a model of such activities.
Undoing a protection is usually regarded as quite difficult and expensive. In some
cases, hackers opt to overcome a protection by tampering with the code or the execution
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Fig. 9: Model of hacker activities related to defeating protections by undoing, overcom-
ing, working around, or bypassing them.
(see incoming relations of Overcome protection in Figure 9). This means that instead of
reversing the effect of a protection (e.g., deobfuscating the code), they gather enough
information to be able to manipulate the code and the execution so as to achieve the
desired effect, without having actually removed the protection. Gathering the infor-
mation and performing the manipulations with the protections still present typically
requires a considerable effort in analysis, and in building external tools, scripts, or tool
extensions. Overcoming a protection eventually relies on the possibility to alter the
normal flow of execution, this is the reason for a causal relation between Tamper with
execution and Overcome protection.
In some instances, altering the execution flow with external tools is not enough,
not possible, or requires too much effort. In such cases, hackers may write custom
workaround code (Build workaround) that is integrated with or replaces the existing
code, with the purpose of preserving the correct functioning of the software, while at
the same time making the protections ineffective.
Sometimes hackers run program analyses to obtain information that is useful for
manually undoing protections. For instance, dynamic analysis and symbolic execution
can be used to understand if a predicate is (likely to be) an opaque one, such that one of
the two branches of the condition containing the predicate can be assumed to be dead
code that was inserted just to obfuscate the program ([L:F:2] “Undo protection (opaque
predicates) by means of dynamic analysis and symbolic execution”). The analyses
needed to undo protections may be quite sophisticated, hence requiring non trivial
tool customization (see incoming relations of Undo protection in Figure 9).
To overcome a previously identified protection, hackers alter the execution. For
instance, if they have identified some library calls used to implement a protection,
they may try to intercept such calls and replace their parameters on the fly; they may
skip the body of the called functions and return some forged values; or, they may
redirect the calls to other functions ([O:F:17] “Tamper with system calls (ptrace) that
implement the anti-debugging protection by means of an emulator”; see causal relation
to Overcome protection in Figure 9). To achieve the desired effect, this might require
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also altering the code (see “used to” relation to Overcome protection; [L:F:7] “Tamper
with protection (anti-debugging), by patching the code [omissis]”).
Tampering with the execution can be more or less expensive, depending on the
intended manipulation of the execution ([P:C:48] “Investigate API usage of the pro-
tection to see how much effort it is to emulate it”). For this reason, a key decision
support activity is Assess effort (see “condition for” relation at the top in Figure 9).
In practice, implementing execution tampering requires non-trivial skills on tools such
as emulators, instrumentation tools, and debuggers, and on the customization of the
execution environment (see “used to” relations at the top). Hackers may even resort to
a custom execution kernel ([O:F:18] “Tamper with system calls (ptrace) that implement
the anti-debugging protection by means of a custom kernel”).
Whenever protections cannot be easily undone or overcome (with the help of exist-
ing tools), hackers build workarounds. Hence, the trigger for this activity is an observed
obstacle that cannot be defeated by simpler means (see “cause” relation at the top in
Figure 9). Since building workarounds is typically an expensive activity, effort esti-
mation is routinely conducted before starting this attack step (see “condition for”
relations at the top; [P:A:51] “Identification of a potential trick to avoid the protec-
tion technique. Estimation of the consequences (scripts and time wasted on this)”).
Moreover, identifying the specific protection (component) to defeat is a prerequisite
for the construction of the proper workaround (see “condition for” relation at the top
in Figure 9). For instance, hackers may intercept decrypted code before it is executed
rather than trying to decrypt it ([O:G:3] “[omissis] Bypass encryption; weakness: de-
cryption before execution”). In the Public Challenge experiment, we found cases where
no workaround was actually necessary and the protection could be bypassed directly
from the debugger, by simply tampering with the data at run time. This justified the
introduction of a new concept, Bypass protection, which is a viable attack technique
when protections and points of attack have been identified, and the effort to actually
bypass the protection is deemed acceptable (see incoming relations of concept Bypass
protection in Figure 9).
Based on the model of execution tampering to undo, overcome, work around, or
bypass protections shown in Figure 9, we can again notice that effort assessment is a key
activity that is carried out continuously. Moreover, such continuous effort estimation
leads hackers to prioritize their attack attempts. If undoing a protection is regarded
as too difficult and too effort intensive, hackers may switch to limited code tampering
or dynamic manipulation of the execution, so as to overcome, work around, or bypass
the protection without reverting it completely. When all of those methods fail or are
deemed too much demanding in terms of effort, attackers can opt for circumventing
a protection by deploying alternative attack approaches that are not hampered by
the particular protection. Making such decisions is a standard activity when attackers
choose the path of least resistance.
4 Discussion
4.1 Research Agenda
Based on the observed attack steps and strategies, we have identified the following
research directions for the development of novel or improved code protections.
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Protections should inhibit program analysis and reverse engineering (see “used to” re-
lation outgoing from Analysis / reverse engineering in Figure 6). While several of the
existing protections are designed to inhibit program analysis (e.g., control flow flatten-
ing; opaque predicates) and (manual) reverse engineering (e.g., variable renaming), in
our study we have noticed that hackers employ advanced program analysis techniques,
like dependency analysis, symbolic execution, and constraint solvers. These techniques
are indeed very powerful, but they come with known limitations. For instance, depen-
dency analysis is difficult when pointers or reflection are extensively used; symbolic
execution is difficult when loops and black box functions are used; constraint solvers
may fail if non-linear or black-box constraints are present in expressions. Protection
developers may exploit such limitations to artificially inject constructs that are difficult
to analyse into the program. Since manual intervention might be needed to help tools
deal with such artificially injected constructs, it would be interesting to perform an
empirical study to test the effectiveness of such solutions. Such a study may compare,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, a control group and a treatment group, which at-
tack software respectively without/with artificially injected constructs. The two groups
would be allowed to use the same program analysis tools. The qualitative comparison
could be focused on the difference in attack strategies and manual comprehension steps
between the two groups.
Protections should prevent manipulation of both the execution flow and the run-time
program state (see relations outgoing from Tamper with execution in Figure 6 and
Figure 9). Intercepting the execution and replacing the invoked functions or altering
the program state is a key step in most successful attacks. Protections that inhibit
debuggers (e.g., anti-debugging techniques) or that check the integrity of the execution
(e.g., remote attestation) are hence expected to be particularly important and effective.
Another approach to prevent execution tampering is the use of a secure virtual machine
for the execution of critical code sections. Our study provides empirical evidence on
the importance of pushing these research directions even further. Human studies could
be designed to determine the strategies adopted by attackers to defeat each of the
above mentioned protections. Such empirical studies would be also useful to assess
quantitatively the relative strength of the alternative protections.
Protections should adopt integrity checking techniques with improved effectiveness (see
the “condition for” relation from Identify point of Attack and Bypass protection).
Both the applications used for the Public Challenge and the ones for the experiment
with Professional Hackers include code guards to verify the integrity of the executed
code. Code guards verify checksum values at run time, and in some cases, if values are
correct the application execution continues, otherwise, the application could crash or
gracefully degrade its performance. Attackers were able to obtain the correct checksum
values by setting breakpoints on valid applications and injecting them with a debug-
ger when requested by the tampered applications, as precisely described in the Public
Challenge report. These lead to the observation that attackers can easily bypass these
integrity protections. Therefore, research should focus on improving the effectiveness of
integrity checking techniques. Research is progressing in this field with remote guards
and software attestation techniques [4], which allow the use of nonces to add “fresh-
ness” at every guard check. Even in this case, using static values (like binaries) is the
main limitation, as variants of the Van Oorschot attack are possible [31]. It is there-
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fore mandatory to build new techniques that use dynamic/run-time information for
attesting the application integrity.
Diversification and hiding of the fingerprints of protections (see the “cause” relation
from Recognize similarity with already analysed protected application to Build the attack
strategy in Figure 7). Protections, especially when automatically applied by a tool-
chain, use the same process and methods to protect the application, but they usually
randomize it, every time with a different seed. On both the Professional Hackers and the
Public Challenge Winner reports, we noticed that experienced attackers (this might be
generalized to smart occasional attackers) easily recognise when the same protections
are applied to different applications, despite the randomization. Therefore, they can
immediately Build attack strategies that aim at reusing methods and tools already used
(and that worked) in the past. Reapplying the same strategies usually does not require
a deep understanding of the code and functionality of the protected application, and
results in a very fast successful attacks. Even if we already noticed in our study that
hackers try to Recognise libraries and Anomalous/unexpected behaviour and perform
Pattern matching, further human experiments can help understanding which are the
characteristics of the fingerprints that can be noticed by estimating the learning effect
of undoing, bypassing, or removing the same protection when applied on different code
(from different applications). Based on these empirical results, it would be possible to
design methods to diversify and hide the fingerprints of protections thus forcing hackers
to resort to other strategies that require more time and effort.
Libraries involved in code protections should be hidden (see relations outgoing from
Recognizable library in Figure 6 and Figure 7). Libraries represent a side channel
for attacks that is often overlooked by protection developers. Our study shows that
protecting the code of the main application is not enough and that the libraries used
by the application and referenced in its code may leak information useful to hackers
and may offer them viable attack points. Techniques to prevent attacks to libraries and
to obfuscate the use of libraries or the libraries themselves deserve more attention from
protection developers. Moreover, vulnerability indicators and metrics could be defined
to determine the occurrence of libraries, system calls and external calls, which can be
regarded as potential points of attack.
Protections should be selected and combined by estimated attack effort (see relations
outgoing from Assess effort in Figure 7 and Figure 9). The (theoretical) strength of a
protection is of course important when deciding to apply it, but according to our study
the perceived effort to defeat a protection is even more important (and indeed it may
differ from the theoretical strength). The perceived strength is defined as subjective
evaluation of the impact a protection may have on hackers decision on how to tamper
with the application (Build the attack strategy). This means that even theoretically
weak protections (e.g., variable renaming) should be used as they increase the attack
effort and may discourage some faster attack strategies. Hence we aim at estimating
the perceived attack effort through novel attack effort prediction metrics. Moreover,
synergies among protections should be investigated. Synergies may increase the effort
necessary to defeat protection more than the sum of the attack effort required by each
protection alone (e.g., apply code guards to render the code modified for out of context
execution purposes unusable, together with obfuscation to render modifications even
more complex). To actually prioritize the protections to apply, more effective metrics
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that estimate the actual potency of protections would be needed, either when applied in
isolation or in combination with other protections. Moreover, it would be interesting to
empirically assess the correlation between such metrics and the actual delays introduced
by protections. The correlation between perceived strength and actual delay would also
be worth extensive empirical investigation.
Effectiveness of protections should be tested against features available in existing tools
or by customizing existing tools (see Choose tool / evaluate alternative tools and Cus-
tomize / extend / configure tool in Figure 8). While this practice might sound quite
obvious, in our experience it is overlooked by protection developers, who usually assess
the strengths of protections either theoretically or through metrics. Empirical evalua-
tion based on deep knowledge and customization of existing tools may provide useful
insights for the improvement of the proposed techniques. This consideration also applies
to all the tools able to Undo protections, like deobfuscators. Indeed, undoing a protec-
tion may be very time consuming, but only if there are no tools able to automatically
perform this attack step.
Out of context execution of protected code should be prevented (see Out of context
execution in Figure 8). This attack strategy is not much known and investigated, but
in our study it appeared to play a quite important role. Protection developers should
design techniques to make the protected code tangled with the rest of the software,
so as to make out of context execution difficult to achieve. A human study could be
conducted to measure the difficulty of out of context execution when the protected
code is made arbitrarily tangled with the rest of the software in comparison with the
initial, untangled code.
Protections should be difficult to defeat without rewriting part of the code as a work-
around to them (see Build workaround in Figure 9). While the perfect protection for a
software asset may not exist [5], practical protections should be designed such that the
only way to defeat them is writing substantial code (e.g., a new library, a new kernel, a
replacement function, etc.). In fact, this increases the attack effort and deters or defers
the attack. What workarounds hackers write in practice and how they elaborate them
is yet another research topic on which little is known and that would deserve further
investigation.
Empirical validation of protections should involve highly trained subjects playing the
role of hackers (see the comparison between Professional Hackers and Public Challenge
Winner reported in Section 3.2). Differently from the amateur hacker, professional
hackers aim for automated and reproducible attacks, which require substantial prepara-
tion of environment and tools, use of sophisticated and advanced analyses / techniques,
deep knowledge and competence. In order for an empirical validation of protections to
produce results that generalize to professional hackers, the involved subjects should
be trained to a comparable level of competence. This requires training on advanced
analysis and techniques, such as symbolic execution, SMT solving, cryptanalysis, data
flow analysis, differential data analysis, correlation analysis. It also requires training
on the tools most widely used by professional hackers, in particular debuggers (see
Tool hierarchy in Figure 4), and it requires strong capabilities to choose/customize/-
port existing and to develop new tools in preparation for the attack. Automation of
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the attack steps is another key difference between professional and occasional hackers,
which deserve attention during training for an empirical study. Advanced tampering
activities, such as tampering with the execution environment, replacing API functions
with reimplementations and executing the protection out of context, may require ded-
icated training, since they seem not to be part of the toolkit commonly available to
the occasional hacker.
Protections should force tools to produce incorrect code representations and structures.
When we discussed our results with professional (malware) reverse engineers, it be-
came clear that protections to mitigate or to complicate and delay reverse engineering
should not only aim for making the program representations, elements and structures
(see Figure 5) harder to obtain (e.g., by blocking the use of tracing tools or debuggers),
to identify (e.g., by injecting many fake XOR operations), and to interpret (e.g., by
means of control flow flattening). When the protections only focus on those attack
processes, such that, e.g., the control flow graph obtained with a disassembler tool like
IDA Pro is incomplete, attackers will typically either manually complete the control
flow graph (via the tool’s interactive functionality) or they will write scripts to extend
the tool (via its built-in scripting support) such that it produces a more complete
control flow graph in later re-runs. The attackers are hence moving forward on their
attack path, implementing an attack strategy and gradually obtaining more complete
and more accurate information. In other words, they are unlikely to start unsuccessful
attack paths based on incorrect assumptions. In fact Piorkowski et al. showed that
developers tend to stubbornly follow even wrong cues [33], moreover Edmundson et
al. [16] showed that even experienced developers tend to overlook important informa-
tion. Protections become stronger if they also succeed in letting the tools produce
incorrect representations and structures, e.g., by including non-existing edges in a con-
trol flow graph or by grouping code fragments incorrectly into functions. Attackers then
determine their strategy and next attack steps based on incorrect information, because
their default modus operandi is to initially accept the information obtained from the
tools as is, and to build on it as is. When that information is incorrect, they will hence
more likely waste time and effort on unsuccessful attack paths before backtracking,
and before questioning the correctness of the information, identifying the issues in it,
and eventually correcting them.
4.2 Threats to Validity
External validity (concerning the generalization of the findings): The purpose of our
qualitative studies was to infer models of the hackers’ activities starting from the hacker
reports. Being the result of an inference process grounded on concrete observations,
our models may not have general validity. Further empirical validation is needed to
extend the scope of their validity beyond the context of the reported studies. However,
during conceptualization we aimed explicitly at abstracting away the details, so as to
distill the general traits of the ongoing activities. Moreover, in order to obtain models
that are applicable in an industrial context, the first experiment was conducted in a
realistic setting, involving professional hackers who are used to perform similar attack
tasks as part of their daily working routine.
Despite the substantially different setting of the Public Challenge, a proportion of
concepts (41%) could be reused to annotate the new report. This indicates a reason-
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able level of generality of the taxonomy and provides a first, initial positive assessment
of its external validity. 14% new concepts had to be added to the taxonomy. This
was expected, because, according to our initial design, the context and hacker profiles
of the second study are remarkably different from those of the first study (amateur
vs. professional hackers, different combination of protections). The fact that the same
person won all five public challenges has certainly limited the variability and expres-
siveness of the narrative we have experienced in the public challenge report. However,
we cannot give objective indications on how the proportion of reused concepts would
have changed with more winners neither can we say if changes in the narrative would
have resulted in an increased number of new concepts. For instance, if the winner had a
more professional profile, we could have experienced an increase in the reused concepts,
while reports from more amateur hackers could have led to a slightly higher number
of new concepts. On the other hand, having a single winner reduced the issues related
to the comparison of reports from multiple persons thus reducing the threats to the
external validity.
Hence, we cannot claim to have reached theoretical saturation. New experiments are
needed to further expand the concept ontology. Still, reuse of a substantial proportion
of concepts in the second experiment, despite the differences, is encouraging.
Data collected in our experiments only refers to the client-side component of soft-
ware systems, because in our settings all the server-side component are considered out
of the attack scope.
Construct validity (concerning the data collection and analysis procedures): We
adopted widely used practices from grounded theory to limit the threats to the con-
struct validity of the study. To be sure that reports contain all the needed information,
we asked professional and public challenge hackers to cover a set of topics while filling
their reports, including obstacles, activities, tools and strategies, and to answer specific
questions.
Internal validity (concerning the subjective factors that might have affected the re-
sults): In order to avoid bias and subjectivity, in the first experiment coding was open
(no fixed codes) and it was performed by the seven coders independently and au-
tonomously. Moreover, precise instructions have been provided to guide the coding
procedure. To complete concept identification and model inference, two joint meetings
have been organized. All the interpretations were subject to discussion, until consen-
sus was reached. Traceability links between report annotations and abstractions have
been maintained. This was effective not only to document decisions, but also in case
of model revision, to base changes on evidences from the reports. In the second experi-
ment coding was closed, except for the new concepts that were added to the taxonomy,
for which it was open (as in the first experiment). Similarly to the first experiment,
precise coding instructions have been provided to the four teams of annotators and two
consensus meetings have been carried out to converge to an agreed annotation of the
Public Challenge report. While some subjectivity is necessarily involved in the process,
the above mentioned practices aimed at minimizing and controlling its impact.
5 Related Work
The related literature consists of the empirical studies conducted to produce a model
of program comprehension and of the developers’ behaviour. Empirical studies on the
effectiveness of software protections are also relevant.
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5.1 Models of program comprehension and of the developers’ behaviour
The construction and validation of program comprehension models have been the topic
of investigation of a huge amount of works since the beginning of the discipline of
software engineering. There is agreement, based on experimental observations [25],
that program comprehension involves both top-down and bottom-up comprehension,
and that often the most effective strategy is a combination of the two, known as the
integrated model [24,26]. A less systematic combination of top-down and bottom-up
models is called the opportunistic model of program comprehension [25].
Programmers resort to a top-down comprehension strategy when they are familiar
with the code. They take advantage of their knowledge of the domain [32] to formu-
late hypotheses [20] that trigger comprehension activities. Hypotheses [20] can take
the form of why/how/what conjectures about the expected implementation. Compre-
hension activities carried out on the code aim at verifying the hypotheses on which
uncertainty is highest. Upon resolution of such uncertainty, programmers build a com-
plete, mental top-down model of the program, consisting of a hierarchy in which the
lowest level hypotheses have been validated against the implementation and mapped
onto the code. When hypotheses fail to be verified, the top-down mental model is
iteratively refined until convergence to a stable model.
The bottom-up strategy is preferred by programmers who are relatively unfamiliar
with the code. Programmers may start with the construction of a control flow model
of the program behaviour [32], to continue with higher level abstractions, such as the
data flow model, the call hierarchy model and the inter-process communication model.
Eventually, programmers obtain a high level, functional abstraction of the implemen-
tation.
In the integrated model [24], programmers work at the abstraction level that is
deemed appropriate for the task at hand and switch between top-down and bottom-
up models. They recognize clues (aka beacons) in the code that point to higher level
abstractions and then they switch to a top-down comprehension of the abstractions
inferred from such clues. This leads programmers to formulate new hypotheses to be
verified in the code, which in turn trigger a new bottom-up phase, consisting of code
search and clue recognition. While the bottom-up phase is usually quite systematic, the
top-down phase tends to be opportunistic and goal driven [28,29]. The opportunistic
strategy has been found to be much more effective and efficient than the systematic
strategy when applied to large systems [22]. However, it has the disadvantage of pro-
ducing incomplete models and partial understanding, which might affect negatively
program modification [24,27,26].
Existing program comprehension models have been investigated in specific contexts,
such as component based [3] or object oriented [6] software development, but to the best
of our knowledge ours is the first work considering the comprehension process followed
by professional and public challenge hackers during understanding of protected code
to be attacked. The work by Sillito et al. [35] investigates general traits of program
comprehension that are common to our observations. However, some activities that
we observed are hacker specific and driven by the hackers’ goal, which is to break
a protection, not to evolve a system, e.g., for adding new features, fixing bugs or
refactoring/adapting the code.
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5.2 Qualitative studies of the developers’ behaviour
The use of qualitative analysis methods in software engineering has gained increasing
popularity in recent years and among the various qualitative methods, GT appears to
be the most popular one. However, according to a survey [36] conducted on 98 papers
that have been published in the 9 top ranked journals, GT is largely misused in existing
software engineering studies. In fact, key features of GT, such as theoretical sampling,
memoing, constant comparison and theoretical saturation, are often ignored. We do
not claim to have used GT in our study. Instead, we claim that some practices that
we adopted are in common with GT. Other practices could not be applied because
of limitations of our experimental settings. The GT survey [36] reports some of the
topics investigated in the 98 qualitative empirical studies analysed for the survey. These
include studies on the software engineering process and on software development teams,
especially in the agile context. For instance, the paper by Lutz Prechelt et al. [34]
investigates the factors that affect software quality in agile teams without dedicated
testers. No mention is made in the survey of any qualitative analysis dealing with the
program comprehension process carried out by hackers. Our search for papers on such
topic has also produced no result.
In other domains in computer security, such as network penetration cyber attacks,
qualitative modeling techniques have been proposed [19,23,40]. Those models and mod-
eling techniques specifically focus on automated intrusion detection, however. The con-
cepts in them are observable symptoms of attack activities in staged network penetra-
tions. By checking whether or not monitored network activities fit within the models
of different types of attackers, network administrators and their decision support tools
can then distinguish benign activities from ongoing attacks. The concepts and relations
in those models are of a completely different nature, and hence not reusable to model
program comprehension activities. If program comprehension is certainly needed to
prepare such attacks (i.e., to spot a bug), none of the existing works about network
penetration report any information.
Our previous experiment [13] of hackers’ code comprehension has been extended in
the present work with an additional experiment based on a public challenge. The report
of the public challenge winner was subjected to the same kind of qualitative analysis
conducted on the professional hacker reports. The additional results have confirmed the
validity of the taxonomy and of the comprehension models extracted from the initial
experiment, but they also allowed us to extend the taxonomy and the models with new
concepts that emerged in the public challenge context, a context substantially different
from the industrial one considered in the first experiment. The substantial number of
concepts identified with the second experiment suggests that theoretical saturation is
not achieved, and that more experiments are needed to enrich the concept ontology.
5.3 Empirical studies on the effectiveness of software protection
There are two main research approaches for the assessment of obfuscation protection
techniques, respectively based on internal software metrics [14,9,2,21,39,8] and on
experiments involving human subjects [38,11,10,41].
Assessment by means of experiments with human subjects has been first presented
in a work by Sutherland et al. [38], who found the expertise of attackers to be correlated
with the correctness of reverse engineering tasks. They also showed that source code
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metrics are not good estimators of the delays introduced by protections on attack tasks,
if binary code is involved. Ceccato et al. [11] measured the correctness and effectiveness
achieved by subjects while understanding and modifying decompiled obfuscated Java
code, in comparison with decompiled clear code. This work has been extended with
a larger set of experiments and additional obfuscation techniques in successive works
[10,41].
While human experiments conducted to measure the effectiveness of protections
often draw also some qualitative conclusions on the activities carried out by the involved
subjects, their main goal is not to produce a model of the comprehension activities
carried out against the protected code. Moreover, the involved subjects are usually
students, not professional hackers. Hence, while these studies contributed to increase
our knowledge of the effectiveness of various software protection techniques, they did
not develop any thorough model of code comprehension during attack tasks.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The goal of this work was to investigate the way hackers comprehend protected code
to be attacked and how they build their attack strategy. We involved professional
hackers in the execution of three industrial case studies, each with a distinct attack
task. We also published eight public challenges, five of which were broken, all of them
by the same hacker. The reports produced by the professional hackers and by the public
challenge winner have been subjected to a rigorous qualitative analysis, resulting into
a taxonomy of concepts and in four behavioral models. The taxonomy consists of 169
concepts associated with the hacker comprehension, attack activities, analysis tools
and identified protections.
The models introduce relations (e.g., temporal, causal, conditional and instrumen-
tal relations) among concepts to explain hackers behavior, i.e.:
– how hackers understand the code and identify sensitive assets within it;
– how hackers formulate and confirm hypotheses to build their attack strategy;
– how hackers choose and customize tools; and
– how hackers defeat protections by undoing, overcoming, working around, and by-
passing them.
The paper presents the commonalities and the differences emerged between the
activities conducted by professional hackers (involved in industrial settings) and by
the practitioner (involved in the Public Challenge). A major difference is represented
by the level of automation and reproducibility of attacks elaborated by professional
hackers, and in their considerable time investment in constructing new tools to achieve
this objective. Practitioners, instead, prefer to try many fast manual attacks or employ
existing general purpose tools.
The paper includes a discussion of possible research directions in code protection
based on the outcome of the empirical investigation. One of them is how to design
novel and stronger protection techniques. Since automated analysis tools play a central
role in elaborating successful attacks, a promising research direction to investigate is
improving protection techniques by addressing known (theoretical or practical) tool
limitations, in order to increase the manual effort in attacks.
While we believe the taxonomy and models have a general validity, it can be
strengthened only by conducting further empirical studies. The relations in our models
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that enable or prevent hacker activities will be investigated in depth with controlled
experiments, to obtain quantitative evidence on their role and power, which in turn
will guide the development of novel code protection techniques.
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A Glossary
analyse attack result: analyse the knowledge obtained from perform an attack step or com-
bination of attack steps
anti-callback stack checks: checks performed on entry to internal functions to verify that
they are not called from externally
anti-debugging: form of software protection that makes it harder for an attacker to attack
a debugger to an executing software to attack it
assess effort: reason about effort needed to perform an attack step
asset: software artefact valuable to attackers, typically the artefacts of the original software
on which security requirements are formulated, plus potentially the protections deployed
on them in so far as those protections become under attack as well
background knowledge: relevant knowledge attackers have before starting attack activities
on a specific piece of software
basic block: sequence of instructions that can only be executed as a whole and in that order
black-box analysis: analysis techniques that only consider the input-output behavior of the
program or a component thereof
brute force attack: try all inputs on a code fragment to obtain the desired input or output
or behavior
build the attack strategy: the making of a decision regarding the next attack steps to be
executed
build workaround: defeating a protection by developing custom code integrated in, or re-
placing parts of, the software under attack (including the protection in it under attack) to
make a protection ineffective (possibly leaving the original software functionality intact)
such that an attack step can be executed.
bypass protection: using debugger commands (or scripts) or other lightweight techniques
to manipulate the execution of the software without altering its code, thus making the
protection ineffective, e.g., by allowing the software execution to progress nominally beyond
the point where the protection was supposed to intervene.
bytecode: non-native instruction set architecture format
checksum: hash computed over some data, in this context typically a code region being
checked by a code guard
choose path of least resistance: reason about and select the potentially successful sequence
of attack steps that will lead to reaching the overall attack goal with the least effort or
cost
choose/evaluate alternative tool: check whether alternative tool overcomes a limitation
of a previously tried tool
circumvent protection: when a protection prevents reaching a goal with one or more specific
attack steps, execute one or more alternative steps that are orthogonal to the deployed
protection (i.e., not hampered by the protection) to reach the same goal
clear data in memory: asset other than key appearing in unprotected (plaintext) form in
binary or during execution
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clear key: cryptographic key appearing in unprotected form in binary or during execution
client-server code splitting: protection whereby part of the sensitive computations is ex-
tracted from a client program and executed on a secure server instead, where it is not
accessible to attackers
clues available in plain text: presence of strings in binary that present clues about protec-
tions, assets, components, ...
code guard: specific form of tamper detection that computes a checksum on code regions
and checks their values by comparing them to pre-computed ones
code mobility: online protection in which static code (and data) fragments are removed from
an executable file (to prevent static attacks) and instead get downloaded from a secure
server on demand during the execution of the software
code representation and structure: static or dynamic representations of software (frag-
ments) and structural forms or elements in it
condition: (combination of) values that inputs, variables, registers, memory locations, ...
need to have in order to let control be transferred into a certain direction during execution
of the software
confirm hypothesis: confirm that a previously hypothesized feature is correct based on the
observation of an attack step’s results
constant: static data with relevant or recognizable, non-mutable values
control flow graph: static representation of potential control flow in a program
control flow graph reconstruction: determining and modelling the potential flow of con-
trol in a program or part thereof
convert code to standard format: the act of converting (byte)code in a custom (diversi-
fied) format to a format known by the attacker
core dump: snapshot image of the software’s memory space during its execution, containing
code and data segments such as stack, heap, and code sections from binaries
correlation analysis: statistical analysis where correlations between operations or data oc-
currences are determined or analysed
correlation between observed values: the presence of statistical correlation in a set of
data values observed in a program, memory, or a trace
create new tool for attack: create new standalone piece of software to aid in attack (e.g.,
a main binary that invokes functionality in library under attack in a specific order and
that feeds it specific data)
crypto analysis: use of cryptanalysis techniques
customize execution environment: adapt software or hardware in execution environment
in ways supported by their developers such that it supports specific attack tasks
customize/extend tool: adapt tool in ways supported by tool developers and tool itself
(e.g., availability source code) or exploit its built-in extensibility to let it perform specific
tasks
data and program state: static or dynamic non-code aspects of a binary or running process
data flow analysis: analysis techniques that determine how computations and computed
data depend on other computations and (computed or input) data
deobfuscate the code: use manual or automated tools to revert an obfuscation, i.e., to re-
duce its apparent complexity to that of the original , non-obfuscated code
debug/superfluous features not removed: functionality present for software development
purposes (e.g., debugging aids) that was not removed before distributing the binaries and
that can be leveraged by attackers
debugger: tool used to test and debug software by offering support to inspect and manipulate
the status of running software
debugging: using debugger functionality to observe, control, and manipulate a program’s
execution
decompile the code: obtain source code equivalent of machine code
decompiled code: representation of binary software code at the abstraction level of source
code
decompiler: software that translates assembly language into equivalent source code
decrypt code before executing it: (large) code fragments only available in encrypted form
become available in decrypted form at run time
defeat protection: successfully undo or overcome or bypass a protection, or build a workaround
for it, such that an attack step that the protection was supposed to mitigate can be exe-
cuted successfully.
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dependency analysis: analysis techniques that determine which computations and com-
puted data depend on which other computations and (computed or input) data
difference between observed values: the fact that two values in a trace, binary, or mem-
ory have different values
differential data analysis: statistical analysis where not the original observed operations or
data are considered but differences between multiple occurrences
difficulty: problem encountered during an attack task that is caused by a feature, artefact
or limitation of the attacker’s toolbox, i.e., of the specific software or hardware attack
aids being used or considered during a concrete attack (that are not normally used during
benign use of the software under attack).
diffing: identifying the differences between two programs or parts thereof
disable anti-debugging: tampering with code to skip execution of anti debugging protection
actions
disassemble the code: use a tool to convert binary encoding of software into human read-
able machine code
disassembled code: representation of binary software code at the abstraction level of as-
sembly code
disassembler: software that translates machine language into assembly language (and deter-
mines the structure thereof, e.g., in the form of control flow graphs)
diversified cryptographic libraries: libraries with non-standard implementations of stan-
dard cryptographic primitives
dynamic analysis: analysis techniques based on observations made during program execu-
tion
emulator: hardware or software that enables one computer system to behave like another
system
evaluate and select alternative step / revise attack strategy: reason about effort, suc-
cess probability, usefulness, ... of possible next attack steps, building on results of previous
attack steps, and select next steps / revise decisions and selections made earlier regarding
next attack steps to execute
execution environment: operating system, platform, network settings, etc. in which the
code has to be executed
file: a resource for storing information, typically on a storage device
file name: symbolic identifier of a file
file format analysis: black-box analyses that consider the formats of input and output files
function / routine: software components making up programs in most programming lan-
guages
function argument: data (and value thereof) on which a function is invoked
function call: the operation of invoking a callee function within a caller function
global function pointer table: standard data structures in binaries that contain addresses
of functions
identify API calls: act of identifying locations in the code or trace, and their nature, where
interaction with public interfaces of external components take place
identify assets by naming scheme: use naming conventions or structure in available sym-
bol information
identify assets by static meta info: use standard information available in binaries (e.g.,
exported symbols) to identify components that embed assets
identify output generation: identification of code around points where output is generated
as starting points of attacks
identify points of attack: identify regions in the program or trace where assets or protec-
tions are available/observable/active/... and hence attackable
initialization function: function invoked by loader upon loading of a program or library
in-memory data structure: data structure found in the memory space of executing soft-
ware
knowledge on execution environment framework: relevant knowledge attackers have about
the execution environment or framework in which they will execute attack steps or in which
the software normally executes
lack of knowledge: inexperience of attacker, not knowing relevant aspects
lack of portability: fact that a tool or technique available in one context (e.g., platform) is
not available in the context in which the attacker wants to deploy the tool or technique
library / module: partition of an application as defined in software engineering
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limit scope of attack: identify regions in the software or in an execution trace where next
attacks steps should focus on, thus reducing the size of the code or data or trace where
the attacker needs to perform next attack steps, thus reducing the effort to invest in them
limit scope of attack by static meta info: use standard information available in binaries
(e.g., exported symbols) to identify regions in software or traces where next attack steps
should focus on
limitations from operating system: properties of specific operating system on which the
code has to be executed, that limit the attacker’s capabilities in some way
main(): top-level function in an application
make hypothesis: based on the results of previous attack steps and background knowledge
make a hypothesis about the features of an asset, protection, piece of software under attack,
or attack tool capability that, if true, will enable certain attack steps to be performed
successfully
make hypothesis on protection: make a hypothesis regarding the potential deployment or
nature or features of a certain protection
make hypothesis on reasons for attack failure: make a hypothesis based on the obser-
vation that an previous attack step yielded insufficient results
manually assist the disassembler : interact with a disassembler tool to correct and com-
plement its automated disassembler analyses
memory access: the operation of reading or writing to main memory
memory dump: making a snapshot of (parts of) the code and data in the address space of
a running program and dumping that image on disk for later analysis
meta info: standard information available in binaries, in the form of data that is not used
by the software itself, but by the OS to load and launch the software correctly
monitor public interfaces: observing and analysing interaction (invocations, data passing,
communications) between components along publicly available interfaces (such as exported
functions in libraries or system calls)
non-standard virtual machines: customized virtual machines embedded in a protected
program that interprets bytecode (in a custom, non-standard bytecode format) that re-
places the original native code, thus hiding the semantics of the original code
obfuscation: form of software protection that increases apparent complexity of code or data
obstacle: feature or artefact that hinders attack steps and that is deliberatively put in place
(or, if already present a priori, considered relevant for providing protection) by the defender
in protected software, including in components of the software itself or of its execution
environment
obtain clear code after code decryption at run time: identify and extract decrypted code
in memory space of a running application under attack
operation: software functionality at the lowest level of granularity / abstraction
out of context execution: execute code fragments not as they are normally executed within
the full program’s execution, but in other crafted contexts (such as self-written main
binary)
overcome protection: Leaving a protection present and (partially) active, but manipulating
the code and execution of the software or fragments therein such that the goal of an
attack step is reached despite the protection still being present and (partially) active.
This typically requires the custom, targeted development of external scripts and software
components. The resulting code or execution are not necessarily representative for the
original software as a whole, but they suffice for the attacker to reach his goal.
pattern matching: identifying code or data fragments of interest by comparing candidates
to known patterns
prepare the environment: set-up and configuration of environment to execute and/or at-
tack the program
process / parent-child relation process are instances of software executing on a computer;
parent processes launch child processes
program input and output: external data consumed and produced by a program
profiler: tool used to collect statistics about execution of software elements
profiling: collecting statistics on a program’s execution and its components (functions, in-
structions, libraries, ...)
protection: software protection technique applied on software under attack
recognizable library: part of software under attack that corresponds to a known library
and is identified as such by the attacker
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recognize anomalous / unexpected behavior: observe program features that contradict
hypothesis about normal behavior given background knowledge of the attacker
recognize similarity with already analysed protected application: recognize that parts
of a new piece of software under attack, although it maybe has been protected differently,
is identical to parts of another software already attacked before, such that the knowledge of
the already attacked version can be reused, thus reducing the amount of reverse-engineering
effort needed
recreate protection in the small: create small program containing protection mock-up to
aid in the development of attacks on that protection
reference to API function / imported and exported function symbolic description of
externally visible (standard library) functions provided by or needed by libraries and mod-
ules
register: a component inside a central processing unit for storing information, that can be
addressed directly in assembly code
remote attestation: online protection technique in which a secure server demands a running
client to provide attestations to verify the integrity of the client
replace API functions with reimplementation: use of hooking, interposers, detours and
other techniques to intervene in execution when external functions are invoked
reuse attack strategy that worked in the past: use background knowledge on paths of
least resistance and successful attack paths based on attacks on similar pieces of software
or on pieces of software protected with identical or similar (assumed or identified as such)
protections
round / repetition / loop: specific instance of a program fragment execution in a trace
containing multiple subsequent executions of the fragment; strongly connected component
in a control flow graph
run analysis: invoke an automated analysis in a tool
run software in emulator: use emulation to execute software and to execute dynamic at-
tacks
size: amount of code or data considered by an attacker
socket: data structure and its interface serving as an internal endpoint for sending and re-
ceiving data over a network
software element: aspects of a program of interest to an attacker
static analysis: analysis techniques that do not require code to be executed
statistical analysis: use of statistical techniques to identify and/or recover operations or
data or features of interest
stderr: output connection through which many programs output error messages
string: sequence of alphanumeric text or other symbols in memory or an executable file
string / name analysis: extracting information from names of files, exported functions,
strings referenced in code fragments, etc.
switch statement: control flow structure resembling a switch () { case ...: case ...:
} structure in C code
symbolic execution / SMT solving: determining (semantic) properties of code fragments
using symbolic execution and SMT solving techniques
system call: the operation invoking system routines from the operating system
tamper detection: forms of software protection that try to detect that normal execution or
code has been modified
tamper with code statically: edit code in the binary, e.g., to implement a workaround
tamper with data: alter data during the execution of a program
tamper with execution: alter ongoing execution by altering code or data
tamper with execution environment: adapt software or hardware in execution environ-
ment in ways not intended by their developers such that it supports specific attack tasks
tool: any software or hardware aid that automates activities needed in attack steps or that
performs a task (semi)automatically
tool limitations: practical limitations (supported file sizes, memory consumption, lack of
precision, ...) of a tool that make it unfit for the specific way an attacker wants to use it
trace: sequence of executed code fragments with or without additional properties of their
execution
tracer: tool used to collect sequences of executed software elements and attributes of their
execution
tracing: collecting a sequence of activities occurring during the execution of a program (in-
structions being executed, system calls, library calls, etc.)
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understand code logic: act of reasoning about a code fragment
understand persistent storage / file / socket: act of reasoning about overall program
behavior regarding storage - files - sockets
undo the protection: reversing the effect of a protection by undoing its deployment, i.e.,
reverting to the software without the protection (e.g., deobfuscating code or removing code
guards).
weak crypto: use of cryptographic techniques that are even weak against black-box attacks
white box cryptography: form of cryptography where keys do not occur in plain sight
during execution
workaround: of a difficulty: adaptation of tool or new tool that overcomes the limitation of
existing attack tool; of a protection: see build workaround
write tool supported script: customize a tool using its built-in scripting features
XOR operation: the operation of performing an XOR on two or more data values; these
occur very frequently in and around cryptographic primitives
